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Abstract

This thesis aims to explore the method and content of Joseph Ratzinger’s
aesthetics from a philosophical perspective. Ratzinger takes up Plato’s description
of man’s encounter with beauty as a wounding by the power of eros, and argues
that the involvement of emotion in this experience does not render it irrational,
but rather, stresses that the feeling of beauty is in accordance with logos, since the
domain of logos reaches far beyond abstract processes of reasoning. Moreover,
Ratzinger rejects the notion that beauty is simply a cover over what is
fundamentally ugly. According to Ratzinger, beauty is the foundation of reality
because it is convertible with logos, which after all, is not simply unchanging
being, but also person, that is, Jesus of Nazareth, who ultimately reveals beauty as
truth and love in the form of both eros and agape.
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Introduction

The consideration of beauty in Western culture has been moving away from the
context of transcendental metaphysics since the time of Descartes.1 Today, beauty
may be thought of as an emotional response to meaningless sensory stimuli,
which is an aesthetic attitude much indebted to David Hume, while others may
relegate beauty to the subjective realm as described by Immanuel Kant.2 After
Kant, we come across various aesthetic theories associated with an understanding
of beauty as an immanent concept subservient to the human will. For instance,
Friedrich Nietzsche takes up Arthur Schopenhauer’s pessimistic thoughts on the
power of the will and transforms it to claim that the chaotic frenzy of the
Dionysian element is the ultimate aesthetic principle. Finally, following the
atrocious massacres of the Twentieth Century, Theodor Adorno proposes that
ugliness is the ultimate reality of which beauty is a privation. 3
Joseph Ratzinger reflects on these philosophical arguments and considers whether
they are valid.4 He does not dismiss them out of hand, but asks the same questions
addressed by the various philosophers: is beauty really a metaphysical reality? Is
1

Arthur Pontynen, For the Love of Beauty: Art, History, and the Moral Foundations of Aesthetic

Judgment (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 303.
2

Nick Zangwill, "Aesthetic Realism 1," in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, ed. Jerrold

Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 78; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste,
2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 119, 43.
3

Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and

Dionysus," in Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts, ed. Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W.
Conway (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 58-61; Peter Uwe
Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art Adorno's Aesthetic Theory Revisited (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2013), 94.
4

Joseph Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty," Message to the

Communion

and

Liberation

(CL)

meeting

at

Rimini

(24-30

August),

(2002),

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20020824
_ratzinger-cl-rimini_en.html.
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it not simply emotional and hence irrational and subjective? Is it not a means of
deception and a show of power? Finally, like Adorno, Ratzinger ponders upon the
suffering of humanity, and asks whether it is not ugliness that is the ultimate
foundation of existence. 5 In this thesis, I will argue that Ratzinger is able to
respond to these questions in favour of a new understanding of beauty by his
openness to three sources of knowledge: (1) philosophy, engaging with both
modern philosophical aesthetics as well as classical metaphysics, (2) theology,
with particular emphasis on the thought of Augustine, and (3) personal experience,
reflected in his recounts of profound encounters with beauty in art and worship.
For Ratzinger, beauty is united with truth and goodness and these together
constitute the metaphysical transcendentals. He explains, however, that there is
something missing in the Ancient Greek metaphysical understanding of beauty,
which is made utterly obvious by Adorno’s existential critique that after the
Holocaust there can be no real beauty. Ratzinger reveals that a response to this
can only come from a project founded on a close relationship between philosophy
and theology, which then allows one to see that beauty is not only experienced in
the Platonic sense of transcendental participation, but most splendidly made
known in the icon of the crucified Jesus, whose paradoxical beauty embraces pain
and ugliness. 6 The understanding of beauty as a transcendental in the classical
metaphysical sense is therefore surpassed by a beauty that has a face and a name.
Beauty, then, is a way for us to encounter this person, and yet this person is both
logos and love. The equivalence between person and being in beauty ultimately
has a profound impact on how we understand our own being as persons. 7

5

Ibid., §5.

6

Ratzinger, "The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty". §19.

7

Credo for Today: What Christians Believe, trans. Michael J. Miller (San Francisco: Ignatius

Press, 2009), 126.

2

Structure

The first chapter considers the problems anticipated in a philosophical enquiry
into the aesthetics of a theologian. Frankly, it can be said that a philosophical
enquiry into Ratzinger’s works is justified because his theology is founded on
philosophical thoughts and methods.8 In fact, it is Ratzinger himself who asserts
that philosophy and theology are necessarily interdependent. 9 According to
Ratzinger, the aim of philosophy is to question, not for the sake of questioning,
but rather in order to arrive at an answer.10 At the same time, it is the nature of
philosophy to seek answers which are unattainable by reason alone. Ratzinger
argues that philosophy must not shy away from discussing such realities as man’s
mortality, but in order to discuss such profound human realities philosophy needs
a starting point, and this where theology becomes indispensable.

11

This

relationship is reciprocal, for theology is unable to reflect on revelation and
express itself without the help of philosophical reasoning. 12
Briefly, then, the first part of the thesis considers Ratzinger’s aesthetics in relation
to classical and medieval metaphysics. The beauty of creation is a pathway to
God who is the true beauty of being and the source of all beauty. 13 This ascent
from the experience of beauty in created things to the contemplation of the divine
is fostered by eros which unifies man in his own being.

8

14

Finally, the

Cf. Tracey Rowland, Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2009), 5-6.
9

Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 139.

10

Joseph Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," Communio: International Catholic Review

11, no. 4 (1984): 351, 55.
11

Ibid., 354.

12

Ibid., 356.

13

Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel," (Vatican Publishing House, 2009).

14

"Deus Caritas Est," Encyclical, (2005); Joseph Ratzinger, "Liturgy and Sacred Music," 13, no. 4

(1986): 386-87.

3

transcendental convertibility between goodness, truth and beauty means that
beauty is able to reveal what is both good and true.15
The second section of the thesis compares Ratzinger’s aesthetics with that of
Hume and Kant respectively. Hume considers beauty to be simply a natural
sentimental response, whereas Kant finds significance in beauty only in relation
to the moral subject.16 Ratzinger, on the other hand, suggests that if our hearts are
sincerely open to the reality of experiences, we will be able to recognize not only
our desire for the infinitely beautiful, but also for the metaphysical reality of the
good and the true.17 To touch one’s heart is to have an effect on his whole being
including his sense of what is reasonable and what is morally just.18 Accordingly,
Ratzinger explains that if one is to be open to the richness of transcendent beauty,
he must prepare his heart to receive it, which includes practising moral discipline
and contemplative exposure to the beautiful. 19
The final section of the dissertation concerns the problem of beauty in the context
of Nietzschean nihilism as well as Adorno’s negative dialectics. Both strongly
question the transcendental understanding of beauty, Nietzsche by overturning the
Apollonian–Dionysian dichotomy in favour of the Dionysian, and Adorno by
posing existential and moral arguments against the beautiful. 20 Ratzinger is able
to provide a response to these criticisms by going beyond the classical
understanding of beauty and incorporating both philosophical and theological
reflections that present beauty as the presentation of love and truth.
15

Benedict XVI, "Meeting with Artists in the Sistine Chapel."; Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The

Glory of the Lord, a Theological Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1982), 18.
16

Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, xii.

17

Joseph Ratzinger, Behold the Pierced One: An Approach to a Spiritual Christology (San

Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 67-68.
18

Cf. Benedict XVI, "Message of His Holiness Benedict XVI to Archbishop Gianfranco Ravasi,

President of the Pontifical Council for Culture on the Occasion of the 13th Public Conference of
the Pontifical Academies on the Theme: 'The Universality of Beauty: A Comparison between
Aesthetics and Ethics'," (2008).
19

Ibid.

20

Hohendahl, The Fleeting Promise of Art Adorno's Aesthetic Theory Revisited, 99.

4

Method

For the purpose of exploring Ratzinger’s aesthetics I have undertaken a literature
review of Ratzinger’s published works available in English. Almost every speech
and publication during his papacy have been translated into English, whereas
many of his earlier works are yet to be translated from the German. It may be
known to the reader that Ratzinger’s oeuvre was recently published in German,
amounting to fourteen volumes in total, but so far only the volume on the liturgy
has been translated into English.
Those familiar with Ratzinger’s theological works will also recognize that there
has been remarkable consistency in Ratzinger’s thoughts throughout his academic
life, and the same can be said of his aesthetics. The Vatican website has published
many formal addresses and homilies, of which there are hundreds mentioning
beauty. Of particular note is an address given to The Communion and Liberation
Movement three years before his election to the papacy, entitled, The Feeling of
Things, the Contemplation of Beauty.21 In this speech, Ratzinger makes the point
that beauty is more than a fleeting pleasure as judged by the senses. He points to
Plato’s understanding of participation and eros, and brings in Augustine to
consider beauty as revealed in the face of the suffering Christ. 22
This study relies on the fact that Ratzinger often discusses philosophical points in
the context of a theological argument. Ratzinger gives philosophical insights
relevant to his aesthetics in such notable titles as Introduction to Christianity,
Dogma and Preaching, The Spirit of the Liturgy, Principles of Catholic Theology,
Nature and Mission of Theology, Eschatology, and On the Way to Jesus Christ. 23
Secondary sources available in English have also contributed to my understanding
21

This address was given a new title when it appeared in a book compiling some of his work three

years later: Joseph Ratzinger, "Wounded by the Arrow of Beauty: The Cross and the New
‘Aesthetics’ of Faith," in On the Way to Jesus Christ (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005).
22

"The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty".

23

Cf. Bibliography

5

of Ratzinger’s thoughts on beauty, especially commentaries on his theology by
Tracey Rowland, Aidan Nichols and Emery de Gaál. 24
The study compares Ratzinger’s aesthetics with that of Plato, Augustine, Thomas
Aquinas, as well as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche and
Theodor Adorno. These philosophers have been chosen in respect to Ratzinger
response to their thoughts as well as for their contribution to aesthetic philosophy.
There are also contemporary philosophers and theologians mentioned in the study
as they are often referred to by Ratzinger in the context of a discussion on
aesthetics, for example, Josef Pieper, Romano Guardini, Luigi Giussani and Hans
Urs von Balthasar. In fact, the entire thesis effectively takes the form of a
literature review, and for this reason a separate chapter dedicated to such a review
has been omitted.

24

Tracey Rowland, Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed (London; New York: T & T Clark,

2010); Ratzinger's Faith: The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI; Aidan Nichols, "The Thought of
Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger," Burns & Oates;
Emery de Gaál, The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010).

6

PART I - Metaphysical Beauty

7

1.1.1

The Integration of Philosophy and Theology

The task of this study is to explore Ratzinger’s philosophical thoughts on beauty,
but immediately there seems to be a problem: Ratzinger is not a philosopher but a
theologian, and as such his philosophical deliberations are perhaps not to be taken
alone but rather simply as in support of his theological arguments. In this regard
one might consider his philosophical considerations to be superficial or hardly
relevant. However, if we study Ratzinger’s works carefully we come across many
important philosophical discussions on matters such as metaphysics, moral
conscience and death, which all interrelate with his aesthetics. Furthermore, to
characterize Ratzinger as a theologian simply dabbling in philosophy does little
justice to the profundity of his philosophical insights. To be sure, Ratzinger does
not claim to be an academic specialising in philosophy, but we shall see that this
does not exhaust the meaning of a philosopher.
As already mentioned, not only does philosophy contribute to Ratzinger’s own
theology, but he himself contends that philosophy necessarily accompanies
theology. Ratzinger says, “the integrity of faith depends on rigor of philosophical
thinking, such that careful philosophizing is an irreplaceable part of genuine
theological work!” Theology cannot express itself without the help of reason and
the language of philosophy. Yet he also adds, “As a theologian, I do not regard
philosophy as being, ultimately, a study which we pursue for philosophy’s
sake”. 25 This is because, for Ratzinger, philosophy does, in fact, belong “within
the wider totality” of a theological discourse. 26 The reason for this is that
philosophy asks questions that it cannot answer by itself, and so depends on
theology for its own functioning.
What is then to be said of philosophers rejecting theology and theologians
claiming to practise theology without philosophy? Ratzinger attempts to
demonstrate the errors of this severance, and endorses a thoroughly
25

Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, trans. Michael Waldstein, 2nd ed.

(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 269.
26

Ibid.

8

interdependent relationship between the two disciplines. He does this principally
by the way he incorporates philosophy in his own theological works. Ratzinger
also provides a historical reflection explaining that in the dawn of Christianity, the
contemplation of the divine was not seen as a counterpoint to the object of reason,
but rather, theology converged with Greek philosophy right from the beginning.27
Here, Ratzinger points to Justin Martyr who summarizes the primary task of the
philosopher as asking about God and living according to the Logos (λόγος).28
Indeed, the Christian understanding of God as logos gave it a great impetus to
incorporate elements of Greek philosophy. Ratzinger explains that “Logos means
both reason and word - a reason which is creative and capable of selfcommunication”. 29 This word features as the primary designation of the Son of
God in John’s Gospel, and Ratzinger interprets this as characterising the Christian
God as a God of reason. Therefore, theology can never be separated from
reason. 30 Ratzinger also notes how Christianity appealed first and foremost to
philosophy rather than to religious cult, such that the major dogmas of the
Christian faith must be said to have emerged under Hellenistic influences. 31 At the
same time, it must be added that the relationship is mutually dependent, for reason
derives from the God who is reasonable, or rather, God is the perfection of reason
itself, as Ratzinger explains,
27

Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections," Lecture of the

Holy Father. Apostolic Journey to Munchen, Altotting and Regensburg: Meeting with the
representatives of science in the Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg (September 12),
(2006), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html.
28

"Saint Justin, Philosopher and Martyr," General Audience, (2007).

29

"Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §5. Regensburg Address.

30

Introduction to Christianity, 27.

31

Ibid., 138; Cf. Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 356. Ratzinger quotes Tertullian’s

argument, “Christ called himself truth, not custom”, and so stresses that Christianity had opted
“for the logos as against any kind of myth” (See Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity,
141.Tertullian, quoted in Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity, 141). Interestingly, it is the same
Tertullian who later famously denounces philosophy as an impediment to theology by positing
“what has Athens to do with Jerusalem” (Tertullian in De praescriptione haereticorum, cited in
Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 354.

9

The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the
intelligibility of our existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the
reasonableness of God, even though his understanding infinitely surpasses
ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness 32
We can see that the historical relationship between philosophy and theology was
one of integration, especially as both were understood to be “striving for the same
logos”.33
Ratzinger observes that Augustine is a great example of the synthesis of
philosophy and faith as demonstrated by the inclusion of Platonism and
Neoplatonism in his theology.34 However, after Augustine there is a depreciation
of this interrelationship. In fact, by the time of Thomas Aquinas, theology and
philosophy are seen as separate fields altogether, with each distinguished by their
respective domain of enquiry: supernatural revelation for the former, and natural
reason for the latter.35 For John Duns Scotus, faith and reason need not correlate
as God is completely free and not bound to reason or to goodness. Scotus
dispenses with Thomas’ analogy of being and suggests that our sense of goodness

33

Benedict XVI, Introduction to Christianity, 139. Here, Ratzinger further explains that

“The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the intelligibility of our
existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the reasonableness of God, even though his
understanding infinitely surpasses ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness” [Ibid.].
34

"Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §7. Ratzinger explains that it is

not only scripture that influences Augustine toward the love of the faith, “But also philosophy,
especially that of a Platonic stamp,” which “led him even closer to Christ, revealing to him the
existence of the Logos or creative reason” ("Saint Augustine of Hippo (5)," General Audience, 5
(2008).)
35

Ratzinger contends that since this time, “philosophy has been assigned to the area of pure reason

and theology to the area of revelation” (Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 353.).
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and truth cannot in any way reflect the all-powerful God because his essence is
utterly transcendent.36
Continuing this into the sixteenth century Martin Luther makes the relationship
between philosophy and theology absolutely void because metaphysics is rejected
in the pursuit of a simpler faith.37 With the advent of Kant’s radical subjectivism,
metaphysics loses its place as a legitimate means of philosophical enquiry
altogether. Kant seeks to express pure reason uncontaminated by a priori
assertions of faith, after which Martin Heidegger labels “Christian philosophy” a
paradox, suggesting that philosophy’s purpose is to question rather than to explain
an already accepted answer.38 Heidegger therefore calls for a new philosophy of
“absolute questioning”, which he considers “the highest form of knowledge”. 39

1.1.2 Ratzinger’s Response

Ratzinger argues contra Heidegger that posing questions and then attempting to
remain uncommitted to a solution is a dishonest way to do philosophy. He
suggests that rather than merely questioning, the true philosopher is one who is
unafraid of finding an answer. 40 In other words, the philosopher only achieves his
goal by engaging with reality, and it is precisely the philosopher’s task to
approach reality as it is, undeterred by apparent difficulties and limitations.
Ratzinger then proposes that the philosopher must attempt to understand the
mystery of death, the fate of all man. Yet since man is incapable of seeing beyond
36

Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §7. Scotus

proposes univocity of theological predication and so adheres to the radical metaphysical difference
between God and man.
37

Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 356; Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the

University Memories and Reflections". §9.
38

Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 353.

39

Heidegger, Die Selbsthehauptung der Deustschen, 12 quoted in Josef Pieper, In Defense of

Philosophy: Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1992), 115.
40

Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 351, 55.
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the horizon of death Ratzinger believes the Christian testimony of the resurrection
must be considered a “spur” for deeper philosophical enquiry. 41
For the same reason, Ratzinger argues that the a priori of religious traditions
should not be dismissed out of hand, but instead should be treated as welcome
stimuli for philosophy. Ratzinger asks "How can philosophical thought be set in
motion without some a priori concepts".42 Ratzinger further explains,
…reason must listen to the great religious traditions if it does not wish to
become deaf, dumb and blind precisely to what is essential about human
existence. There is no great philosophy which does not draw life from
listening to and accepting religious tradition. Wherever this relation is cut
off, philosophical thought withers and becomes a mere conceptual game.43
In other words, a philosophy that seeks the truth honestly and humbly would be
willing to entertain an answer, even if it originates from divine revelation. As
such, Ratzinger proposes that the Christian faith can lead to a deeper
understanding concerning the reality of death, and so guide philosophy in the
pursuit of truth. He says,
For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the
great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and
those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to
ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and
responding. 44

41

Ibid., 354.

42

Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 357; Here, Ratzinger may also be referring to

Dietrich von Hildebrand, who asserts that “The object of philosophy is primarily of an a priori
nature” (Dietrich von Hildebrand, What Is Philosophy? (Franciscan Herald Press, 1973), 63.)
43

"Truth and Freedom," Communio 23, no. 1 (1996): 31; Cf. Josef Pieper, For the Love of

Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 68-73.
44

Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §15. Ultimately

for Ratzinger, “Philosophy, the search for meaning in the face of death, presents itself as the
search for Christ” (Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 351.).

12

Ratzinger refers to Josef Pieper concerning this. According to Pieper, philosophy
seeks to make sense of whatever we encounter, and so is naturally open to an
answer deriving from theology. 45 Pieper points to Sartre as a counter-example and
accuses him of denying the existence of God “uncritically and without the shadow
of any justification”. 46 Pieper contends that in such a case, the philosopher’s
rejection of theology “takes on the character of a creed, whether or not one is
aware of it and comfortable with it”. 47
At the same time, just as philosophy cannot answer itself when it poses questions
concerning death and eternity, theology is inevitably grounded in philosophical
methods and language. The attempt to dissociate theology from the limits of
philosophy, exemplified by Martin Luther and Karl Barth, cannot succeed
because philosophical thought necessarily pervades theology. If either discipline
is to genuinely pursue the truth, it must recognize that the counterpart is
indispensable for its own functioning. They are complementary and neither can
claim to be an exclusive approach to truth.48
Ratzinger explains that it is fitting that philosophy and theology work together in
“a reciprocal and advantageous collaboration”. 49 It is no accident that Aidan
Nichols posits that, ultimately, Ratzinger wishes to unite “philosophy and
theology in a single, internally differentiated but also internally cohesive,
intellectual act.”50 If philosophy and theology are not mutually exclusive sciences,
45

Pieper, In Defense of Philosophy: Classical Wisdom Stands up to Modern Challenges, 115.

46

Ibid., 111.

47

Ibid.

48

Ratzinger, "Faith, Philosophy and Theology," 356.

49

Benedict XVI, "Saint Thomas Aquinas (2)," General Audience, (2010).

50

Aidan Nichols, The Conversation of Faith and Reason: Modern Catholic Thought from Hermes

to Benedict XVI (Hildenbrand Books, 2011), 288. Also see p. 193, where Nichols defines a central
theme in Ratzinger's works as "a convergence of the mainly philosophical disclosure of logos
with the chiefly theological revelation of love"; Cf. Tracey Rowland, "The Role of Natural Law
and Natural Right in the Search for a Universal Ethic," in Searching for a Universal Ethic:
Multidisciplinary, Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the Catholic Natural Law Tradition,
ed. J. Berkman and W.C. Mattison (Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 165. This should help
clear up some doubts concerning a philosophical enquiry into the works of a theologian.

13

but rather, jointly conducted disciplines aiming at the one truth of reality, then a
theologian must be reflecting on and referring to philosophical thoughts in his
works. This is very much true in the case of Ratzinger, and this study aims to
demonstrate in particular the way Ratzinger integrates philosophy and theology in
his approach to the problem of beauty.

1.2.1

Transcendental Participation

According to Ratzinger, the experience of beauty occurs through the process of
remembrance (anamnesis), which is a natural tendency in man towards
transcendence, a “godlike constitution of our being” pointing away from
oneself. 51 He says,
This anamnesis of the origin … is not a conceptually articulated knowing,
a store of retrievable contents. It is so to speak an inner sense, a capacity
to recall, so that the one whom it addresses, if he is not turned in on
himself, hears its echo from within. He sees: ‘That’s it! That is what my
nature points to and seeks.’52

51

Joseph Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth," Communio 37, no. 3 (2010): 535.

52

Ibid. In this article, Ratzinger replaces the medieval term “synderesis” with the above concept of

“anamnesis” (p. 534). He also explains that “anamnesis” is the exact word used by Paul in his
letter to the Romans describing the conscience of the Gentiles, whereby they have held “a law to
themselves—not in the sense of modern liberal notions of autonomy that preclude transcendence
of the subject, but in the much deeper sense that nothing belongs less to me than I myself”
(Romans 2:14ff). By highlighting the word “anamnesis”, Ratzinger illustrates that natural law is a
kind of memory of the primordial forms; one that is outward focused, and which is able to draw
out of oneself the desire for something greater, precisely as he recognizes that his being is rooted
in something greater than himself. In being drawn by this desire for greatness, he simultaneously
becomes aware that he is answerable to something natural and intrinsic to oneself. Here, Ratzinger
is writing, not in psychological terms, but in ontological terms. The conscience belongs to our
essence as human beings. In other words, we have an “inner ontological tendency” toward the
good, which describes what is popularly referred to as our “moral compass” (p. 535).

14

At the same time, in our experience of beauty we are only given a glimpse of its
perfection and we are left pondering what the fullness of infinite beauty might be.
Ratzinger refers to Aristophanes from Plato’s Symposium, who explains that
“lovers do not know what they really want of one another”, for the heart only has
“a vague perception of what it truly wants and wonders about it as an enigma”. 53
Ratzinger further explains that the experience of beauty is an encounter that is
primarily passive, “a shock” that comes from outside of us. He describes it further
as being “touched, or rather wounded… the arrow of nostalgia pierces man,
wounds him and in this way gives him wings, lifts him upwards towards the
transcendent”.54
This concept derives from Plato’s description of the beauty in the Phaedrus.
According to Plato, beauty arouses a remembrance of the world of the Forms and
gives the soul the power to ascend to it. 55 Now, the Forms are perfect and
incorruptible beings, whereas objects in visible space and time are simply
becoming. 56 At the same time, one can say that the Form is in the visible object,
and conversely the object possesses or shares in the Form.57 Accordingly, visible
beauty for Plato can considered beautiful “because it partakes of (metechei) The
Beautiful Thing”, and it is only “by The Beautiful thing that all beautiful things
come to be beautiful”.58
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We must also mention Plotinus, for whom the semblance of the creative One is
marked in creation in such a way that the visible world becomes a sign of and
pathway to the invisible One.59 Plotinus is particularly important here because of
his influence on Augustine, who replaces the One with the Christian God, such
that sensible beauty originates from God himself. 60 Augustine brings together his
knowledge of philosophy and the Scriptures to assert that the beauty of creation
“proclaims that its maker could have been none other than God, the ineffably and
invisibly beautiful”. 61 In other words, the beauty of the invisible creator can be
seen through the visible created world.
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understanding of participation which grounds Ratzinger’s aesthetics.
According to Ratzinger, whatever is truly beautiful owes its beauty to the God
who is supreme beauty. In an eschatological sense, the beauty of the world we see
is passing and the perfect and infinite beauty of God awaits us, but at the same
time, Ratzinger suggests that the theory of participation is not about escaping the
material world in a dualistic sense.63 In the same way, we must note that although
Plato’s development of the idea of beauty culminates in man’s capacity to
transcend the world of appearances, the means of achieving this is precisely via
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the sensory world. 64 As Ratzinger explains, the experience of beauty is not about
leaving the world behind, but rather implies being “anchored in the world yet
open to God” and thereby transcending the division “between the beauty of things
and God as beauty”.65
Therefore, Ratzinger suggests that an important function of art is to facilitate an
encounter with the transcendent God. He says,
A work of art is a product of the creative capacity of the human being who
in questioning visible reality, seeks to discover its deep meaning and to
communicate it through the language of forms, colour and sound. Art is
able to manifest and make visible the human need to surpass the visible, it
expresses the thirst and the quest for the infinite. 66
Ratzinger points to the works of Antoni Gaudi as instances of beautiful art that
stimulates anamnesis through the visible forms of “stones, lines, planes, and
points”.67 Ratzinger also reflects how in a Gothic church, “we are enraptured by
the vertical lines that soar skywards and uplift our gaze and our spirit, while at the
same time we feel small yet long for fullness....”68
Ultimately, he says to artists,
Authentic beauty… unlocks the yearning of the human heart, the profound
desire to know, to love, to go towards the Other, to reach for the Beyond.

64

Pieper, Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus, Ch. 6. Pieper

maintains that the erotic emotion, this same overpowering emotion which gives wings to the soul
and leads it back home to the abode of the gods, has the character of passion, of ravishment by
something in the visible world, and that therefore—like all other "passions"—it springs from the
body and the senses.
65

Benedict XVI, "Apostolic Journey to Santiago De Compostela and Barcelona - Eucharistic

Celebration on the Occasion of the Dedication of the Church of the Sagrada Familia and the Altar
in Barcelona," Homily, (2010).
66

Benedict XVI, "Art and Prayer".

67

"Apostolic Journey to Santiago De Compostela and Barcelona - Eucharistic Celebration on the

Occasion of the Dedication of the Church of the Sagrada Familia and the Altar in Barcelona".
68

"Art and Prayer".

17

If we acknowledge that beauty touches us intimately, that it wounds us,
that it opens our eyes, then we rediscover the joy of seeing, of being able
to grasp the profound meaning of our existence, the Mystery of which we
are part.69
Ratzinger explains refers this process by which we encounter God in the
experience of beauty as the via pulchritudinis, “the way of beauty”.70 The deep
thirst and quest for the infinite can only be quenched by the delight in the union
with God himself, who is “Beauty ever ancient, ever new”. 71

1.2.2 Transcendental Convertibility

Along with the theory of participation, Ratzinger’s thoughts on beauty refer to the
metaphysical principle of transcendental convertibility. This is the concept that
presents beauty’s interchangeable relationship with goodness and truth. It has
origins in Ancient Greek metaphysics, and is seen in Plato’s writings on truth,
goodness and beauty as eminent or divine Forms, as well as in Aristotle’s
metaphysics, where he sets the transcendentals apart from his ten categories of
existence.72 Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, explains that being, truth and
goodness are the same reality, although differing in concept; being denotes the
object’s very existence and essence, truth expresses its knowability, and goodness
its desirability. 73 As for beauty, there is some doubt as to whether Thomas
69
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considers it a transcendental along with goodness and truth.74 John Dadosky and
Leo Elders both suggest that the reason behind Thomas’ omission of beauty from
his list of transcendentals might be due to his conviction that beauty is in some
way different from the other transcendentals. 75 This conclusion seems to be in
agreement with Ratzinger’s aesthetics, especially as it relates to Balthasar’s
understanding of beauty. Ratzinger alludes to this in his papal address to artists,
where he cites Balthasar description of beauty as forming “a halo, an untouchable
74
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crown around the double constellation of the true and the good and their
inseparable relation to one another”.76
According to Balthasar, “unity, truth, goodness and beauty do not belong as
properties possessed at one’s own disposal”, but rather point “to the primordial
ground of being which replicates itself in it in an image”. 77 This primordial
ground of being is God himself, which means in each individual being the
transcendentals disclose the imprint of the divine being. 78 This disclosure occurs
through the being’s form, which is both its beauty and its essence:
Being inevitably includes being of a certain kind (species) or, what comes
to the same thing, a form (forma), two words which imply both “essence”
and “Beauty” and are immediately understood by Augustine in this duality
(speciosus and formosus), “beautiful”, “well-formed”.79
This dual characteristic of the form is also recognised by Thomas Aquinas, who
says in his Summa Theologiae:
Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are
based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness
is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly
76
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relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and
therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of
movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the
cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen.
Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things
duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind - because even sense
is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty.80
In summary, the desirability of the form refers to the good, and the relationship of
the form to the mind signifies its beauty. Furthermore, truth is concerned with the
knowability of essences, and the beauty of the form in due proportion acts as a
means to its knowability. This suggests that it is precisely through the object’s
beauty that being is revealed as good and true. Elders points to this idea when he
says, “To the extent that the beautiful is ordered to the cognitive faculties it is
related to the true, while to the extent that it satisfies the appetitive faculty, it is
related to the good”.81 In other words, beauty is a transcendental precisely in its
capacity to present both the good and the true.
According to D. C. Schindler, Balthasar develops on this notion by describing the
event of desiring the good and being drawn by the truth in terms of the
“subjective-objectivity” of the beautiful. 82 The subject, through his senses, grasps
the form, but then is “enraptured” by the splendour of eternal being which draws
the subject into a deeper encounter.
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our reach”.84 Therefore, in the subject’s contemplation of the form, the form itself
reciprocates by the irruption of splendour from within. 85
There is an interaction, then, between the subject and object, such that it is not
only the observer who approaches the beautiful, but it also happens that the
beautiful approaches the observer. In order to see the objective truth, one must be
“drawn out of himself toward the object”, and this is only possible if one is
affected by the good, that is “the simultaneity of desire and self-gift”. 86 The
encounter with beauty enables this meeting between the subjective desire for the
good and the objective vision of truth.87
This is very important for Ratzinger, who points out that Plato’s notion of
philosophy as the pursuit of eternal Being with the strength of eros is in fact
compatible with the Christian life. The philosopher’s task is to seek the truth
understood as “Being itself, or even more - the Good and the Beautiful that are
beyond Being”. 88 The search for goodness and beauty is in fact both a moral
activity and a search for God, for “The beauty of the works of which the Gospel
speaks, refers beyond them to another beauty, truth and goodness whose
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perfection and ultimate source is in God alone”.89 Ratzinger founds this idea on
the Greek term kalà erga, which is used in Scripture to mean both good and
beautiful at the same time. The moral activity of man is made beautiful when it is
acted in accordance with truth, for “the beauty of works manifests and expresses,
in an excellent synthesis, the goodness and profound truth of the action, as well as
the coherence and holiness of those who perform it”. 90
The convertibility of the transcendentals, then, is highly relevant for positing the
interrelation between the aesthetic and moral realms of human life. This is
important for Ratzinger who believes the separation between aesthetics and ethics
presents a major crisis in our time. He says,
The need and urgency for a renewed dialogue between aesthetics and
ethics, between beauty, truth and goodness, is once again proposed to us
not only by the current cultural and artistic debate but also by daily reality.
In fact, the split emerges dramatically at different levels and at times there
is a glaring contrast between the two dimensions: the search for beauty,
understood reductively as an external form, as appearance, to be sought at
all costs, and that of the truth and goodness of actions carried out to
achieve a specific goal.91
Ratzinger believes that the problem of aestheticism and a degrading moral life are
associated with the separation of beauty from truth and goodness. Moral relativity
89
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depends on the perceived separation of moral goodness from truth. However,
even when the relationship between conscience and truth is respected, truth itself
becomes liable to err when beauty is neglected. Ratzinger describes this situation
by recalling the medieval idiom, “reason has a wax nose”, which is to say that, “it
can be pointed in any direction, if one is clever enough”. 92
Ratzinger believes that we can be aided in our pursuit of the truth and the good by
being wounded by the arrow of beauty. Beauty reminds us of the truth and
goodness of being and of God, and so gives us the desire to respond with all our
heart. If by their convertibility in being, beauty is true and truth beauty, then the
encounter with beauty must be a rational experience. Ultimately, Ratzinger
explains that, “The beautiful is knowledge certainly, but, in a superior form, since
it arouses man to the real greatness of the truth”. 93 This is connected with
Ratzinger’s understanding that “being itself is true, in other words apprehensible,
because God, pure intellect, made it, and he made it by thinking it”. 94 In other
words, the knowledge imparted by the encounter with beauty is the knowledge of
being, and of God, the logos, the foundation of all reason, which goes beyond the
knowledge of facts and of human history. 95
Thus far we have considered Ratzinger’s understanding of beauty as derived by
the metaphysical presentation of both philosophy and Christian theology.
Ratzinger holds that beauty is a transcendental, and this means our experience of
it can draw us on beyond the material world and become an encounter with being
itself, which is to say, an encounter with God, who is logos. As such beauty can
give us knowledge of God, and direct us towards truth and goodness. In the next
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chapters, we will discuss whether this knowledge derived from beauty is indeed
rational, and how this knowledge might be different from that of facts and history.

1.2.3 Analogy of Being

To help appreciate Ratzinger’s integration of philosophy and theology as reflected
in his thoughts on beauty, we must understand the concept of analogy by which
theological truths are expressed in metaphysical terms. Ratzinger says,
All human knowing is accomplished with reference to and within this
world. Consequently, if human knowing is to make a statement about
something that is not “world”, it can do so only with the materials of this
world; it cannot grasp that something in its proper being, as it is in itself,
but only by means of approximations and similarities that exist within
worldly being, therefore “analogously” in comparisons and images. 96
This operation of language to express the relationship between being and God
refers the notion of analogia entis (analogy of being). 97 According to the
Thomistic tradition, it is the linguistic corollary of the metaphysical principle of
participation, whereby human words describing God are thought to participate in
the fullness of the original principle predicated of God.98 Ratzinger notes how in
any description of God the “unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness,
yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language”. 99 In other words,
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analogy of being works because there is a genuine relationship between the
reason and language of the spirit and the reason and language of nature.100
Analogia entis has a particular relevance for Martin Heidegger who opposes the
attempt to equate God with being. Heidegger calls it “onto-theology” and
considers it intrinsically flawed because it is a metaphysics that “determines how
the deity enters into it” and does not give room for the Dasein to conceal and
disclose itself in its own terms. 101 More specifically, Heidegger’s concern is not
that onto-theology arrogantly endeavours to make sense of God, but that it does
not even attempt to understand being. 102 For Heidegger, Christian philosophy
abuses ontology because it only borrows it as a way of falsely grounding a
preconceived theology.
Here, again, we must turn to Balthasar, a theologian commended by Ratzinger for
his work on aesthetics among other things. Balthasar responds to Heidegger by
suggesting that the metaphysics of being is not to be seen as a restriction of God,
but conversely, as a means of conveying precisely God’s transcendence. 103 For
likeness ("Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections". §7.) Ratzinger also
provides a longer summary of analogy with reference to Thomas Aquinas: “The correctness of
theological reasoning and its real cognitive meaning is based on the value of theological language
which, in St Thomas' opinion, is principally an analogical language. The distance between God,
the Creator, and the being of his creatures is infinite; dissimilitude is ever greater than similitude
(cf. DS 806). Nevertheless in the whole difference between Creator and creatures an analogy
exists between the created being and the being of the Creator, which enables us to speak about
God with human words.” ("Saint Thomas Aquinas (2)").
100
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Balthasar, God is not actually being, but rather, beyond being. 104 When we say
that God is being, it must be taken analogously for the true meaning of being is
beyond us. Ratzinger takes this up in his own consideration of God and being,
which has implications on his understanding of beauty. We shall see that, for
Ratzinger, the philosopher’s God of pure Being is transcended by the God of faith.
Ultimately, Ratzinger integrates his theological understanding with philosophy for
a unique perspective on beauty as person, where the divine and transcendent
beauty is not only the delight of eros, but also simultaneously agape, a love that
goes to the end.

Balthasar who, in his Glory of the Lord, challenges Heidegger’s critique by suggesting that
metaphysics thinks God in terms of being rather than restricting him to being. The principle of
analogia entis establishes a relationship with the being of the world and the being of God, but it
does not abrogate God’s transcendence in any way. In fact, precisely by its commitment to
analogy, analogia entis affirms God’s infinite difference. In this way, the validity of metaphysics
is upheld.”; Cf. Schindler, "Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Metaphysics, and the Problem of ontoTheology," 110.
104
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PART II - Reason and Experience

28

2.

Introduction

In Part One, we explored the theory of participation and the convertibility of the
transcendentals, which together form an important part of Ratzinger’s
metaphysical aesthetics. As discussed, Ratzinger is very much influenced by
classical and medieval philosophers, most notably Plato, Augustine and Thomas
Aquinas.
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In line with these thinkers, Ratzinger considers metaphysics

indispensable for philosophy. Of course, man is unable to ascertain truth in its
entirety, and yet, like Plato, “he can love it and search for it” and that is what he
considers the activity of a true philosopher. 106 He says, “philosophy is a great
reaching out for eternal Being, a learning to contemplate truth, a rational effort of
the Spirit to find true meaning”. 107
However, there are various theories of aesthetics allegedly detached from
metaphysical principles. For instance, David Home focuses on the experience of
man at the expense of reason, and so presents an aesthetics based on sentiment,
while Kant places the mind at the centre of experience and so offers a purely
subjective aesthetics. Metaphysical beauty is also rejected by the positivists
because it is not in accordance with scientifically verifiable knowledge.
Ratzinger’s metaphysical aesthetics is therefore in conflict with a number of
modern aesthetic theories. The remainder of the study will explore how these
theories relate to Ratzinger’s thoughts on beauty.
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2.1

David Hume

Let us start by considering David Hume, who gives an empiricist account of
causality, faith and standards of taste based on the principle of induction. That is,
“that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly
represent”. 108 For instance, Hume suggests that our adherence to theories of
causality come about from repeated experience of conjunctive events, however,
they are in fact nothing but an assumption connecting past experiences and
projecting them to future ones. According to Hume, then, theories of causality
cannot be considered valid if we are to follow the rules of logic. 109
Hume applies similar empirical principles to explain the notion of beauty, which
is a concept arising from man’s experience of a particular pleasure. Now, he
distinguishes two sources of pleasure and hence two types of beauty, the first
being simply taking pleasure in the external form of an object. This pleasure is a
sentiment that arises “by the primary constitution of our nature”, that is, as part of
a physiological response to perceiving an object with a particular order to its
constituent parts.110 The second and more common experience of beauty derives
from the imagination’s delight in the object’s apparent utility. 111 In sum, Hume
reduces beauty to a sensation owing to man’s physiological nature and his
capacity for imagination.
In order to validate his thoughts on beauty Hume adds an explanation for the
validity of intersubjective judgements. 112 He comments that there are “general
108
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rules of art” which are “founded only on experience and the observation of the
common sentiments of human nature”, and yet the aptitude to recognise these
general principles vary in degree from subject to subject. 113 He then proposes a
number of conditions that might make one an ideal critic, including a sound mind,
thorough exposure to art, delicate senses, and the lack of ill prejudice. 114 Hume
believes these criteria limit the correct perception of the beautiful to the
competent critic and so avoids the relativist position that “a thousand different
sentiments excited by the same object, are all right: Because no sentiment
represents what is really in the object”. 115
However, it is difficult to reconcile the rejection of relativity with Hume’s own
basic contention that “beauty is no quality in things themselves”. 116 Although
Hume postulates the existence of rules or principles by which an art critic is to be
selected and so supposes that someone at least can judge an artwork as beautiful
or not, the rules themselves are empirically derived. In other words, Hume’s
strictly empiricist approach to philosophy leaves no room for a metaphysical
consideration of beauty.

2.1.1 Ratzinger on the Value of Experience

Ratzinger takes the experience of man seriously as removed from any theories of
science and so is in agreement with Hume in many ways. Ratzinger knows that
speculative thought can be too rigid and ultimately meaningless, as exemplified in
the “dryness of a type of scholasticism” that have become “stale and brittle”. 117
That is why, when speaking on freedom’s accountability to the truth, Ratzinger
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says, “let us refrain from setting to work with abstract philosophical
considerations. Rather, let us try to approach an answer inductively starting from
the realities of history as they are actually given”.118 He goes as far as to say that
“all human knowledge must have a sensory structure; it must have its beginning
in experience, in the perception of the senses”. 119
For Ratzinger, a proper understanding of beauty arises from one’s sense
experience of it. He thus points to his very own experience of beauty and
considers it valid evidence for characterising it as a potent and intimate encounter
that leads to the contemplation of God. One particular experience which stands
out for Ratzinger is that of a Bach concert conducted by Leonard Bernstein in
1981. Ratzinger recalls:
When the last note of one of the great Thomas-Kantor-Cantatas
triumphantly faded away, we looked at each other spontaneously and right
then we said: ‘Anyone who has heard this, knows that the faith is true’. 120
In this experience of beauty, Ratzinger claims to an acute awareness of the truth
without mediation, or rather, the reality of the faith manifest in the beauty
mediated by sound and the senses. Now, if the aim of philosophical abstraction is
to understand reality and provide a reasoned expression to describe it, then it can
only be considered secondary and analogous to that actual reality, or an instance
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of it. This is why theories of metaphysics can only develop in an attitude of
openness to the concrete experience of reality.
At the same time, to reflect on one’s personal experience alone and to ignore the
experience of others is to restrict the scope of one’s understanding. Therefore,
Ratzinger refers to the value of collective human experience in the writings of
past and contemporary thinkers. We are responsible for evaluating the thoughts
and traditions that are part of our culture, but this is not a simple task given that
even our evaluation is conditioned by the same culture we live in. We cannot
shake it off and begin only with experiences. Each person is born into a society
with a specific culture established by others before him, and so it is clear that
human knowledge does not start from scratch, or tabula rasa.121 This means that
the evaluation of experience by pre-conditioned patterns of thought must be
verified by further contemplation of the experience. In other words, thought and
experience work together to achieve an understanding of reality. That is why
Ratzinger comes to the knowledge of the transcendentals from his own encounter
with reality and by engaging with the various traditions of philosophy and
theology.122

2.1.2 Abstract Thinking

Since the intention to remove abstract thinking derives from abstraction, one can
only pretend that empiricism does away with abstract thought. Nevertheless,
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s positivism attempts to devalue abstract thinking by
reducing philosophical thought to the analysis of ordinary language. As
philosophy becomes more and more detached from the pursuit of metaphysical
121
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truth, any proposition that is not inherently comprehensible within the ordinary
meaning of the terms used is deemed too abstract and irrelevant to a positivistic
philosophy. That is, without metaphysics, an argument might be judged by its
grammatical logic rather than its appeal to truth. Moreover, truth itself becomes
simply another term that can be discarded.
Ratzinger, therefore, argues against positivism saying that, “by its exactness,
exact knowledge bars the way to wisdom, which asks about the most profound
depth of our existence”. 123 The positivist’s exact knowledge depends more on
established theories from repeated sensory observation as opposed to any kind of
immediate sensory experience because the latter is considered prone to error. So
while on one hand positivism presents a materialist view of the world, on the
other hand, it undermines the significance of the very sensory experience which it
alleges to derive knowledge from. The push for scientific thinking has established
a dichotomy then between thought and experience, such that every experience,
from the sensory to the spiritual, is deemed untrustworthy.
Ratzinger points out that with the support of the scientific successes in today’s
technological era, positivism has taken a strong hold in popular thought. All
propositions that are strictly scientific theories are considered completely relative,
as Ratzinger explains, “natural science has nourished a skepticism with regard to
everything which cannot be explained or proved by its exact methods: all such
things seem in the end to be a mere subjective assignment of value which cannot
pretend to be universally binding”.
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able to open his sense of reason and encounter beauty’s full transcendental
grandeur. However, this is only possible if we understand the capacity for
experience to be a rational encounter in and of itself, rather than being limited to
being a scientific endeavour to establish facts.
To accept this, we must recognize that reason and experience are not at odds with
each other, but nor are they reducible to the one or the other. In fact, they nourish
each other so that one can perceive reality as it is. This is how the philosopher
uses reason well, that is, by precisely contemplating the “totality of things we
encounter”. 125 Luigi Giussani, a philosopher highly respected by Ratzinger,
explains that “Experience itself, in its totality, leads to the authentic
comprehension of the term reason or rationality”. 126 Therefore, experience of
reality is necessary to reasoning. Reason is something that “illuminates the factors
within” reality, and is characterised by “unexhausted openness” to the real. This
openness even extends to the recognition that reality surpasses man’s capacity to
understand it.127
Ratzinger speaks similarly in his citation of Nicolas Cabasilas’ two ways of
acquiring knowledge. The first way is pedagogical which does not depend on the
direct experience of things, whereas the second way allows the formation of a
more certain knowledge and is gained only “through a direct relationship with the
reality”. 128 The two ways can be conceptually distinguished, but they are both
faculties of the one reason. To contemplate beauty is in no way “a flight into the
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irrational”. 129 This is the kind of thinking that reduces the consideration of beauty
to a mere sentiment.
Ratzinger contends that one needs the cooperation of reason if he is to recognize
true beauty. This reason is one that is open to the rational character of the
experience. He asserts that “We are fighting to expand reason, and hence for a
reason which, precisely, is also open to the beautiful and does not have to set it
aside as something quite different and unreasonable”. 130 Now, to expand reason
means to recognise the full capacity of reason to do more than analyse causation,
process empirical data and calculate logical algorithms. 131 Indeed, Ratzinger
suggests that reason can achieve more than linguistic organization and conceptual
thought. This is shown by its application in the experience of the beautiful.
According to Ratzinger, the aesthetic experience is a fundmental activity of
reason, such that, “Reason that intended to strip itself of beauty would be halved,
it would be a blinded reason”. 132
According to Ratzinger, “man’s being resonates with some things and clashes
with others”.133 This does not imply that the response to beauty is simply relative,
but rather, that man is naturally directed towards beauty and needs to become
aware of his own nature. Ratzinger suggests that one way we can verify this is to
deeply reflect on our experiences:
Not all satisfactions have the same effect on us: some leave a positive
after-taste, able to calm the soul and make us more active and generous.
Others, however, after the initial delight, seem to disappoint the
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expectations that they had awakened and sometimes leave behind them a
sense of bitterness, dissatisfaction or emptiness. 134
The experience of beauty is one that is considered absolutely rational, but not in
any restrictive sense of it being calculated or analysed logically, even though it is
also significance in these terms as one uses reason to reflect on one’s experiences.
Ultimately, however, the experience of beauty calls for a renewed understanding
of reason itself; one that sees it not simply as a process of abstraction, but a power
to appreciate one’s experiences at the level of being.

2.2

Immanuel Kant

2.2.1 Aesthetic Judgment: Free Play and Universal Validity

Whereas Hume elevates the role of the sentiments and passions, so that at the
same time reason is in demise, Kant proposes the activity of the mind as the entire
occupation of man. Kant’s subsumption of experience under the categories of
abstract ideas leads to the dismissal of metaphysics as a viable means to interpret
aesthetic judgments. As such, Kant’s aesthetics can be said to have much in
contrast with Ratzinger’s perspective on beauty. From a reflection on these
differences we shall see that, for Ratzinger, the recognition of beauty as a
transcendental is made possible by the heart, the meeting place of the rational and
the subjective at the centre of man’s being.
Kant begins his theory of aesthetics in his so-called “third critique”, the Critique
of Judgment, by positing pleasure as the element by which the judgment of the
beautiful can be distinguished from any other experience. 135 This pleasure, he
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claims, is not merely a physiological response to sensory stimuli, as Hume
suggests, but something that is produced from the harmonious interaction of the
senses with the rational faculties of imagination and understanding. 136 Kant calls
this interaction “free play” because the understanding is free to unify the various
aspects of beauty presented by the imagination. 137 Pleasure, or the feeling of
satisfaction, is associated with free play because it gives us the impression of
having arrived at a natural goal of understanding as if in conceptual thought.
However, the harmony achieved by the imagination and understanding occurs
without any deference to empirical concepts. Now, whilst we owe the pleasure of
beauty to an intuition of unity within the mind as if it was forming new concepts,
any actual conceptual thought fosters interest, which in turn renders the observer
unable to judge beauty. This is because beauty is only experienced in a state of
complete disinterestedness. 138
Like Hume, Kant wishes to avoid the conclusion that taste is completely relative.
Therefore, he develops these thoughts further to give an account of the
intersubjective validity of the judgment of taste. As mentioned, for this judgment
to be made, one must approach the object with complete disinterestedness. Kant
believes that when this condition is met, the agent who experiences pleasure in
the judgment of beauty will necessarily presume that the same judgment will be
made by anyone else who observes the same object in the same environment. In
other words, the judgment of pleasure arising from the perception of an object is
accompanied by a simultaneous a priori judgment that this pleasure will be
experienced by all others.139
In other words, if one were to think to oneself: “This object is wonderfully
beautiful, but I’m sure my sister wouldn’t find it beautiful,” it could be said that
he has not experienced beauty at all, but has mistaken for the judgment of taste a
pleasure owing to some other interest. This is because, according to Kant, the
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judgment of beauty necessarily supposes universal validity. 140 He says, “in a
judgment of taste, the pleasure which we feel is imputed to others as necessary,
just as if it were a property of the object, determined to [belong to] it according to
concept”.141 This can be considered Kant’s way of ensuring that the judgment of
taste is not simply seen as a relative construct that differs without rule from
subject to subject.
Now, the question arises: does Kant believe that a genuine encounter with beauty
actually results in universal agreement in practice? That is, if one approaches an
object with disinterestedness and feels a pleasure accompanied by a judgment of
universal validity, does it mean everyone will agree with it in reality? If so, then
we are living in different worlds, or nobody could claim to have properly
experienced beauty, simply given the fact that opinions vary as to whether
something is beautiful or not. Well, actually, Kant clarifies that “The universal
voice” is only an “idea”, such that:
…he who believes himself to be making a judgment of taste actually
judges in accord with this idea, may be uncertain; but that he relates his
judgment to such an idea, insofar as it is a judgment of taste, it is
proclaimed by his expression of “beauty”. For himself he can be certain
through his mere consciousness of the abstraction of everything pertaining
to the agreeable and the good from the delight remaining to him; and this
is all for which he promises himself the agreement of everyone: a claim
which under these conditions he would also be justified in making, were it
not that he often sinned against them and therefore made an erroneous
judgment of taste.142
The judgment of universal validity is therefore only an assumption that
accompanies the judgment of the beautiful, which does not actually imply the
agreement of subjective tastes in practice. The apparent discrepancies in taste are
140
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attributed to erroneous judgments. This occurs when the pleasure one feels is
improperly attributed to the beauty of an object, that is, when the object is not
approached with disinterestedness. So, in such cases, the pleasure that is
mistakenly attributed to beauty actually comes about from the satisfaction of
some other interest. 143 Kant stands by his theory of universal validity and
considers it an important aspect of the judgment of taste as an a priori judgment.
On the one hand, Kant presents the judgment of taste as a subjective experience
that does not correspond to determinate properties of the object, such as symmetry
or colour.144 On the other hand, for the universality of the judgment to apply to
other subjects, even from a subjective non-practical standpoint, there is a need for
grounding the judgment on a broader concept that incorporates both the
experience of the subject and the object considered on its own. Kant proposes a
solution in “the concept of the supersensible”, which becomes the transcendental
ground for “the object (and the judging subject as well) as object of sense, and
thus as appearance”. 145 He considers the supersensible sufficient to resolve the
conflict, for provided the concept is indeterminate, the judgment of taste is not
dependent on a particular property of objects. 146 Now, the supersensible is a
concept which “cannot be determined by intuition, through which nothing can be
known, and thus also from which no proof of the judgment of taste can be
drawn”.147
However, in postulating the perception of beauty by mediation of a transcendental
in Kant’s own understanding of the term, Kant moves the aesthetic judgment into
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the realm of metaphysics, and therefore goes beyond self-imposed conditions of
subjective epistemology. 148 Despite this internal inconsistency, Kant maintains
that beauty is not a metaphysical reality but rather the subjective experience of
pleasure conditioned by disinterestedness and universal validity. As with Hume,
then, it becomes apparent that Kant’s supposition of subjective validity is
problematic without a metaphysical foundation.

2.2.2 Ratzinger’s Response: The Heart

What Kant considers unknowable, is for Ratzinger, truly knowable in the heart.
Indeed, Ratzinger proposes that the heart, rather than the mind, is the primary
faculty of man. This is because the heart is the centre of man as a whole,
inseparably body, soul and spirit.149 It is in the heart that the senses unite with the
emotions. 150
Ratzinger refers to Origen’s adaptation of the Stoic concept of hēgemonikon,
which is the guiding energy of logos dwelling in man’s heart. Here, heart expands
beyond reason to a deeper reality that has direct connection with the divine. 151 As
such, Ratzinger asserts that the encounter with beauty is more than a momentary
pleasure arising from disinterest. The experience of beauty imparts a knowledge
of truth which is felt and intuited by the heart in a manner that is rational and yet
beyond reason. Therefore, Ratzinger explains that the “impact produced by the
response of the heart in the encounter with beauty” is “true knowledge”. 152
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Ratzinger adds to the understanding of the heart by referring to John Henry
Newman’s motto, “heart speaks to heart”, as well as the words of Blaise Pascal,
“The heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of... We know the truth
not only by the reason, but by the heart”. 153 Both Newman and Pascal are
speaking of the knowledge of God, which Ratzinger considers to be true
knowledge. Romano Guardini expands upon Pascal’s treatment of the heart, and
given that Guardini’s influence on Ratzinger is undeniable, we will briefly
examine the contribution of Guardini here..154
Guardini explains that the faculty of the heart is associated with the appreciating
mind, whilst the faculty of reason is concerned with the theoretical mind.
Nevertheless, both are “mind”, and so can be properly considered receptive to
knowledge. Like Ratzinger, Guardini’s reflection on the heart centres upon the
knowledge of the truth, especially the truths of the faith. Guardini even suggests
that this is the kind of knowledge which fulfills a person:
…the element of value in the divine: the ‘highest good’; that which, in the
nearness of God, is unique, inwardly stirring, which fulfills. That, in other
words, which modern philosophy of religion calls the quality of the
‘numinous’, the value of the ‘sacred’. 155
Guardini continues his reflection on Pascal by giving a hierarchical presentation
of knowledge:
…just as Augustine only became clearly aware of this state of affairs
when he had found the faith, and was in a position to judge from this
higher level of knowledge the possibilities of the lower level, so it was the
event of the Memorial which gave Pascal, along with the experience of the
state of spiritual knowledge, also the judgment about the accomplishment
and limitation of the earlier kind of knowledge [ie. the rational arguments].
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The state of affairs often referred to already recurs: existence is
constructed in levels. The significance and possibilities of the lower
disclose themselves fully only on the higher level. Life cannot be
understood from the bottom up, that is, in a naturalistic way or according
to a theory of evolution, but only from the top down, that is,
hierarchically. 156
When God is perceived in the beauty of nature, one begins to see with a new eye,
a new “vue” opens up, or what Guardini refers to as, “the pneumatic illumination
of mind and heart in faith”. 157 From this perspective, one stands high enough to
see clearly all that belongs to the lower tiers of knowledge. This is a key
consequence of beauty’s transcendental convertibility with truth. That is, the
impact of beauty on our hearts can become a guide to the truth. Ratzinger
emphasizes this when he says,
The encounter with the beautiful can become the wound of the arrow that
strikes the heart and in this way opens our eyes, so that later, from this
experience, we take the criteria for judgement and can correctly evaluate
the arguments.158
The heart wounded by beauty can have such a deep knowledge of the truth that it
becomes capable of being an arbiter of reason. This means that when we
encounter beauty, reason is not put aside, but rather it is broadened so as to make
a judgment from a higher level. For Ratzinger, this is demonstrated in his own
personal experience of beauty. Again, referring to the Bach cantata conducted by
Leonard Bernstein, he says,
The music had such an extraordinary force of reality that we realized, no
longer by deduction, but by the impact of our hearts, that it could not have
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originated from nothingness, but could only have come to be through the
power of the Truth that became real in the composer's inspiration. 159
Ratzinger thus proclaims that beauty is a means for the judgment of truth in all
matters because it is real knowledge that impacts the heart. We can then add this
to the understanding of beauty as an encounter that wounds the beholder and
leaves him yearning for truth. The heart’s capacity to know this truth through the
power of beauty means that this yearning is not in vain.

2.3.1 Kant and the Sublime

It would be unfair to say that Kant considers beauty a simple pleasure of no value,
for the judgment of taste points to an aspect of knowledge for Kant as well; and
that is the knowledge of practical reason. However, the aesthetic signification of
morality occurs primarily in the sublime, which is another aspect of the judgment
of taste in addition to the beautiful. The sublime offers an interesting parallel to
the connection between morality and aesthetics based on the transcendental
metaphysics that underpins Ratzinger’s aesthetics. According to Kant, the sublime
describes the state of pleasure associated with encountering something of great
magnitude or something perceivably threatening. 160 We have said that the
pleasure associated with beauty arises from free play of the understanding and
imagination. In the sublime, the mechanism by which we feel that pleasure is
more complex because it involves a component of displeasure. Kant explains that
whereas “the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of life, and is thus
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compatible with charms and a playful imagination,” in the experience of the
sublime, “the mind is not simply attracted but also alternately repelled by it”. 161
Kant explains that the faculty of understanding contributes to empirical
knowledge but is limited to logical analysis and conceptual thought. The faculty
of reason, on the other hand, is the highest faculty of the mind and is able to unify
the manifolds of sensibility, as well as inquire into both theoretical and practical
properties of reality. 162 In the sublime, the experience is so overwhelming that the
understanding is unable to unify the experience in guiding the imagination. This
means that instead of initiating the process of free play, the sublime calls upon the
higher faculty of reason. However, the imagination is unable to synthesise the
sensory information to satisfy the enquiry of reason, which leads to frustration
and displeasure.163 Nevertheless, this painful feeling of frustration and inadequacy
is only short-lived, for it paradoxically gives way to an appreciation of one’s own
subjective reason as being superior to any perceivably threatening experience, and
this is what causes the eventual pleasure.
There are two distinct situations in which one experiences the sublime. The
mathematical sublime occurs when one encounters a numerical series or
measurement, which overwhelms the observer by its sheer magnitude. However,
in acknowledging the inadequacy of the imagination to represent the infinitely
large, the theoretical reason becomes aware of its own dominance over the
imagination, and this recognition results in pleasure.164 In other words, the feeling
of awe and pleasure in the experience of the mathematical sublime is a result of
our appreciation of the faculty of reason over and above the incalculably vast.
Kant explains that it is precisely because reason is able to recognize itself in the
161
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face of something inestimably large that it is able to exert the “supremacy of the
rational determination of our cognitive faculties over the greatest power of
sensibility”.165
Unlike the beautiful, the judgment of the sublime is not grammatically
attributable to any object.166 That is, the sublime is not a term with which we can
describe a scene or object, but simply an experience. Therefore, one cannot say
“this object or scene is sublime”, but only “I feel the sublime in observing this
scene”. Kant also explains that the experience of the sublime is merely associated
with the subjective feelings generated, such that the object’s “existence is a matter
of indifference to us”.
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representation of nature only plays a causal role in evoking a certain “disposition
of the soul”. 168 This explains how, in the mathematical sublime, the “mere
magnitude, even if it is regarded as formless is able to convey a universally
communicable delight”.169
A similar effect is experienced in the dynamical sublime, which occurs when a
powerful scene in nature incites a response of fear but the scene is simultaneously
judged by the practical reason as non-threatening. An example of this can be
given in the case of seeing out to a stormy sea from the shore. If the practical
reason recognises that the storm is at a safe distance, then the observer would
experience a counter pleasure that overcomes the initial awe and fear. The
experience of the dynamical sublime, then, owes itself to the practical reason,
which not only discloses the very existence of reason but asserts its superiority
over nature, resulting in "soul-stirring delight”.170
According to Kant, the recognition of sublimity is embedded in our nature, but it
is dependent on the disposition of the practical reason which is one’s sense of
morality. The mathematical sublime, in encountering the infinitely great, reveals
165
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the inexhaustible scope of reason, whilst the dynamical sublime, in confronting
the might of the natural world, represents the autonomy of reason. 171 This
autonomy of reason over and above nature confirms that we can exercise our
practical reason freely in spite of what appears to be a natural boundary.
According to Kant, the sublime represents the reason’s “superiority over nature
on which is founded a self-preservation of quite another kind than which may be
attacked and brought into danger by the nature outside us, one where the
humanity in our own person remains undefeated”.172 It allows us to believe that
nature is a “might that has no dominion over us”, and hence helps support Kant’s
notion that our moral freedom is always preserved by the supremacy of practical
reason.173
The judgment of beauty signifies the rational condition of morality by disclosing
pleasure as the natural consequence of disinterestedness, which then “teaches us
to find a free delight in objects of the senses without the charm of sense”.174 In
other words, the experience of pleasure in one’s disinterested approach to an
object analogously represents the rational condition of acting in response to duty
rather than from any other interest. Paradoxically, however, moral signification in
the beautiful is limited because deontic morality is at odds with the prospect of
pleasure as a reward. The sublime overcomes this tension precisely because it has
171
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the element of pain and displeasure. This means that the signification of moral
aptitude is much stronger in the sublime. 175
For Kant, aesthetic taste symbolizes morality and not the other way around, but he
proposes that moral principles set the standards by which aesthetic taste is
developed. He says, “The true propaedeutic for the grounding of taste is the
development of moral ideas and the culture of moral feeling: for only when these
are brought into accord with sensibility can genuine taste assume a determinate,
constant form”. 176 As such, one’s moral inclinations are represented in our taste
for beautiful art.177 For Kant, morality is exemplified in deontic principles and so
one’s response to duty is represented in the disinterested attitude required for the
judgment of taste.
In summary, Kant suggests that the judgment of beauty is dependent on the
observer’s disinterestedness which helps distinguish the judgment from a pleasure
arising from the consideration of the object’s utility. The disposition of
disinterestedness is ameliorated by acting in accordance with moral duty or
practical reason, but Kant adds that the connection between morality and
aesthetics is mostly unidirectional in the aesthetic judgment’s signification of the
deontic moral principle. This makes for an interesting comparison with
Ratzinger’s understanding of the moral-aesthetic connection, which is neither
dependent on disinterestedness nor deontic principles. This relationship between
beauty and moral goodness will be discussed in detail in the following section.
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2.3.2

Ratzinger on Beauty and Morality

According to Ratzinger, beauty is a transcendental, convertible with both the true
and the good. With regards to morality, then, beauty signifies and affects one’s
disposition towards moral goodness and vice versa. Therefore, Ratzinger suggests
that excellent moral habits and frequent exposure to beautiful things have a
mutual affect on the disposition for and appreciation of the other. The negative
correlation also holds true, such that a culture smothered in ugliness sways further
away from receptivity to the moral truth, and a morally corrupt society becomes
blind and unable to recognize the beautiful, thereby establishing a vicious cycle.
For Ratzinger, this short-sightedness in aesthetic and moral sensibilities has its
roots in the notion of subjective existence in accordance with Kant’s elevation of
the reason and the subjective mind as the supreme power over nature. Ratzinger
argues that if everything is subjective then “truth and absolute points of reference
do not exist” and “this way of thinking does not lead to true freedom, but rather to
instability, confusion and blind conformity to the fads of the moment”. 178
Ultimately, the “fads” take the form of a relative moral order facilitated by the
“fragility of consensuses” and imposed by those who “assert their claim to be the
sole rightful representatives of progress and responsibility”. 179 Ratzinger therefore
asserts that “the reduction to experience traps the human person in the subjective”,
for when one’s subjective senses and reflections are not held together with the
objective truths of reality, an attitude of subjective relativity attack goodness and
beauty. 180
The resultant moral relativity that dominates the culture attenuates our ability to
recognise the beautiful, and the lack of appreciation for the beautiful in turn
blinds us further from the recognition of moral truth. These are features of what
178
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Ratzinger calls “anti-culture” or "an overbearing cultural bias,” which distorts
man’s ability to recognise the transcendentals. 181 He says,
….contemporary mankind is characterized by disunity, by a superficial
coexistence and a hostility that are based on self-divinization. As a result,
everything is seen in a false perspective. 182
Ratzinger purports that we are often brought down to our carnal instincts by the
cacophony of banal stimuli. He claims that “Our world is so full of what
immediately impinges on our senses that we are in danger of seeing only the parts
and losing sight of the whole”.183 If the tendency toward selfishness is unabated,
one may end up “full of the rubbish of his own cares and interests”, and so
become unable to hear the voice of the transcendent which requires a pure heart
and an open soul. 184
Therefore, Ratzinger urges people to appreciate the truth of faith and to the truth
of morality, not primarily by demands and cries to conform but by proposing a
culture of beauty. As mentioned, an exposure to beauty not only cultivates our
taste for the beautiful, but it also sharpens our perception of the good and the true.
Ratzinger explains that, “beauty, a kind of mirror of the divine, inspires and
vivifies young hearts and minds, while ugliness and coarseness have a depressing
impact on attitudes and behaviour”. 185 If morality affects our vision of beauty,
then our aesthetic experience affects our alignment with what is truly moral. This
is in line with Augustine and Bonaventure’s idea that when encountering the
beautiful, we ourselves are made beautiful, and when it gazes at the hideous it is
made hideous.186
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Ratzinger suggests that since man grows and develops within a culture, a good
cultural education in beauty is possible through “a kind of pedagogy of desire”,
which may help open the heart to the transcendental dimension. On the practical
level, Ratzinger proposes the following:
Instilling in someone from a young age the taste for true joy, in every area
of life – family, friendship, solidarity with those who suffer, selfrenunciation for the sake of the other, love of knowledge, art, the beauty
of nature — all this means exercising the inner taste and producing
antibodies that can fight the trivialization and the dulling widespread
today. Adults too need to rediscover this joy, to desire authenticity, to
purify themselves of the mediocrity that might infest them. 187
This is the via pulchritudinis, the way of beauty, mentioned in the first chapter as
beauty’s inspired path to the knowledge of transcendent joy. Ratzinger hopes that
we may come to know the importance of education concerning beauty in art and
nature and so be able “to discover or rediscover the taste of the authentic joy of
life”. 188 With regards to art, Ratzinger pays particular attention to the value of
icons and Christian masterpieces which can set us on “on an inner way, a way of
overcoming ourselves”, making the “purification of vision that is a purification of
the heart”.189
Artists, then, have a prominent role to play in the restoration of authentic beauty
in culture. Ratzinger therefore reminds artists that their task is “to awaken wonder
and the desire for the beautiful, to form the sensibility of souls and to nourish a
passion for all that is an authentic expression of the human genius and a reflection
of divine Beauty”. 190
The encounter with the infinite can also be had in our experience of beauty in
nature. This means societies must preserve the beauty of nature by working to
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create a balanced urban landscape. This is the responsibility of every one of us, to
bring to the fore the beautiful in art and nature so that a culture of joy
flourishes. 191
In order to create such a culture of beauty, Ratzinger expresses that beauty must
be sought for itself and each person must exercise adequate discipline to this end.
He explains that beauty is “endlessly comforting precisely because it has no
compulsion to be useful, because it does not owe its existence to a leisure we have
devised for our own”.192 This disinterestedness is not a criteria for a judgment of
pleasure elevating the subjective mind as Kant suggest, but rather, the evidence
that beauty precedes man and his desire to make use of things for himself. Indeed,
beauty does not need to be justified, and yet the contemporary world demands a
reason for it. This is the result of a culture driven by positivism convincing the
people that a scientific rationality is the main paradigm for generating meaning in
material progress, and because the frequent abuse of beauty such as its
manipulation for the sake of pomp, power and profit has bred profound
cynicism. 193
Ratzinger borrows ideas from Paul Evdokimov to comment on how we might be
able to avoid the temptation to desire material progress alone as well as to avoid
the bane of cynicism by purifying our hearts through meditative prayer.
Evdokimov calls this prayer “a fasting of sight” whereby one is able then to see
with one’s heart also and not only with his eyes. An Eastern Christian
iconographer must engage in such a prayer when creating an icon, for “An icon
does not simply reproduce what can be perceived by the senses”. 194 Ratzinger
explains that:
Inner perception must free itself from the impression of the merely
sensible, and in prayer and ascetical effort acquire a new and deeper
capacity to see, to perform the passage from what is merely external to the
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profundity of reality, in such a way that the artist can see what the senses
as such do not see, and what actually appears in what can be perceived:
the splendour of the glory of God…195
This silent contemplation becomes a “purification of vision that is a purification
of the heart”, and the iconographer becomes capable of seeing “an inner way, a
way of overcoming ourselves”. 196 This silent contemplation can then help the
heart reach the same purity of vision that then renders it capable of perceiving the
beauty that is at once true and good.
Consistent with his thoughts on anamnesis and the arrow of beauty which can
lead us to the infinite, Ratzinger advises that individuals should aim to nurture a
healthy restlessness for “a higher good, a deeper good — and at the same time to
perceive ever more clearly that no finite thing can fill our heart”. 197 Exposing
oneself to the beauty of art and nature must go hand in hand with the desire for
transcendent beauty. We will be able to perceive this deeper goodness and truth in
beauty if our hearts are prepared to receive it.
In summary, Ratzinger’s conception of beauty is not one which is simply
connected to morality by way of signification. It is far more relevant to the moral
realm than that, for to experience the beautiful is to see the truth and to be
directed towards moral good. In order to perceive the beautiful, however, one
must purify his heart so that it is not dismissive and cynical. A culture that allows
for this purification is one where authentic beauty is enjoyed from a young age
and where each person is encouraged to reflect upon his feelings and experiences.
By such means, one may be able to live the moral life and hence become beautiful
themselves, and not only that but be referred to “another beauty, truth and
goodness whose perfection and ultimate source is in God alone”. 198
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PART III - Beauty and Existence
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3.1

Friedrich Nietzsche

3.1.1

Greek Tragedy and the Dionysian

Ratzinger and Nietzsche are both critical thinkers who find the aesthetic
experience absolutely crucial in the contemplation of the deepest questions of
existence. Ratzinger, however, finds many errors in Nietzsche’s thoughts,
especially concerning the nature and meaning of eros, and in addition to exposing
these problems to light, Ratzinger forwards a counterargument in favour of
Christianity and Platonic metaphysics.
Nietzsche proposes that ancient Greek tragedy is the pre-eminent art form,
because, unlike the hollow and fake beauty of Christianity and classical music,
Greek tragedy affirms life as it is, with all its suffering and evil. 199 Nietzsche
believes that it is from tragedy that we can derive "the solace that in the ground of
things, and despite all changing appearances, life is indestructibly mighty and
pleasurable". 200 He therefore asserts that “art – and not morality – is the true
metaphysical activity of man”, and that “Indeed, the world is justified
(gerechtfertigt) only as an aesthetic phenomenon”. 201 Furthermore, “art is a
199
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saving sorceress, expert at healing. She alone knows how to turn these nauseous
thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one
can live”. 202
The Greeks achieve this by the presentation of the Dionysian which expresses the
excesses of life full of “contradiction, bliss born of pain”. 203 However, Nietzsche
notes that the Dionysian itself lacks logical form and so must be expressed in the
Apollonian veil of “rest, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through
art and knowledge”. 204 That is, the Apollonian allows the representation of the
otherwise unrepresentable. 205 Nietzsche suggests that this is most poignantly
exemplified in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles. In the chorus of their
tragedies, the sublime Dionysian movements are presented through the measured
beauty of Apollonian forms.206 When the Dionysian breaks forth the Apollonian
is "submerged”. 207 In other words, the Apollonian serves to present the tragedy as
art, but it is only when the Dionysian is released that the truly tragic element
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comes to the fore.208 Dionysus, suffering at the hands of fate, is revealed as the
“real stage hero and centre of the vision,” and the spectator is confronted with a
vision of a hero in agony, inspiring him to affirm life in an arbitrary world, which,
though without meaning, is certainly not without the joy and beauty of the arts. 209
It is clear, then, that Nietzsche wishes to affirm life through the joy of Dionysian
ecstasies and not by the Apollonian forms. The highest function of the Apollonian
is to help man affirm the chaotic ugliness and unrelenting suffering in the
Dionysian. The beautiful form of Apollo is merely a pretence to the world of
becoming that underlies reality.

3.1.2 Ratzinger’s Response to Nietzsche and the Dionysian

Ratzinger counters Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for the Dionysian by saying that the
Dionysian music now heard in contemporary parties and festivals typify the forms
of “anti-culture”, orientated towards “the pleasure of destruction, the abolition of
everyday barriers, and the illusion of liberation from the ego in the wild ecstasy of
noise and masses”. 210 Ratzinger identifies rock music in particular as the reemergence of the Dionysian element stemming from African pagan music. 211 He
suggests that this music intends to immerse the listener in sensual intoxication and
leaves the spirit dull and anaesthetised. 212 In the Dionysian experience, “Man
frees himself … from the burden of consciousness. Music becomes ecstasy,
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liberation from the ego, and unification with the universe”. 213 Ratzinger explains
that the Dionysian represents “the deceptive beauty that makes the human being
seem diminished instead of making him great, and for this reason is false”. 214
This criticism of the Dionysian is founded on something deeper than subjective
dislike of rock music. Ratzinger’s claim is that Dionysian music hinders the
transcendent experience because its nature reflects a metaphysical distortion, a
false perspective of reality that favours ugliness over beauty.215 This distortion is
connected to a false sense of eros; one which “crushes rationality” and “subjects
the spirit to the senses”.216
Ratzinger charges the Greeks of practicing this “dehumanizing” and “counterfeit”
form of eros in their custom of exploiting prostitutes in the temple for the
kindling of “divine madness”. 217 Nietzsche subscribes to this understanding of
eros, seeing in it a possessive sexual desire that denigrates the spiritual. 218
Ratzinger then explains that true eros is one that does not simply seek earthly
pleasures, but an eros that “tends to rise ‘in ecstasy’ towards the Divine, to lead us
beyond ourselves; yet for this very reason it calls for a path of ascent,
renunciation, purification and healing”. 219 This is a passion that is “disciplined
and purified”, so that it can have the potential to “provide not just fleeting
pleasure, but a certain foretaste of the pinnacle of our existence, of that beatitude
for which our whole being yearns”. 220
The true eros is enkindled by a form in conformity with logos, that is, profoundly
ordered to reason. Ratzinger explains that such a form promotes the simultaneous
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“spiritualization of the flesh” and the “corporealization into the body” and is able
to overcome the “warped and destructive form of [eros]”. 221 By allowing the
intimate union of soul and body, a form in accordance with reason prepares man
for the ascending love of eros. This is appropriate because, “it is neither the spirit
alone nor the body alone that loves”. 222 Rather, as Ratzinger explains, “…it is
man, the person, a unified creature composed of body and soul, who loves. Only
when both dimensions are truly united, does man attain his full stature. Only thus
is love —eros— able to mature and attain its authentic grandeur”. 223
Ratzinger asks, “Does [music] integrate man by drawing him to what is above, or
does it cause his disintegration into formless intoxication or mere sensuality?” 224
When one hears the music of logos, the senses are not abandoned but drawn into
the wholeness of his being and thus reaches a spiritual dimension. As both spirit
and sense enrich each other, it becomes “an expression of man's special place in
the general structure of being”. 225 This is what makes rational music beautiful,
because it brings together the flesh and spirit. It behaves as a catalyst for bringing
about a unification of man’s being, ultimately drawing his whole being up to the
transcendent. Whereas Dionysian revelry works against one’s unity of soul and
body by reducing him to chaotic revelry, the music of logos “permits joy… a
higher kind of ecstasy which does not extinguish the person but unites and thus
liberates him”.226
It may be argued that Ratzinger is chiefly concerned with identifying what is
suitable for liturgical music and that as a result his comments do not pertain to
aesthetics as such. It is true that Ratzinger calls for the exclusion of rock music
from the Church’s liturgy, but as already mentioned, this is not out of subjective
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whim, but precisely based on the consideration of aesthetics, that is, the music’s
underlying metaphysical character. 227 In other words, Ratzinger gives liturgical
music metaphysical justification; identifying in it a metaphysical aesthetic theory
where the objective reality of beauty is presented as a transcendental on par with
truth and goodness.
This also means that Ratzinger rejects Schopenhauer’s proposition that music, as
pure will, is anterior to reason. 228 Ratzinger sides with Guardini in claiming that
precedence clearly lies in truth, that is, logos, and not in the will, which represents
ethos.229 Of course, art forms other than music are also capable of reflecting this
priority of logos over ethos. Indeed, the reasoned beauty that reflects the truth of
reality is also perceptible in architecture, visual arts and in literature. 230 Ratzinger
explains that logos, the truth of being, is the standard by which art reflects the
relationship of cosmic laws and so becomes a channel for man to achieve
harmony in his own being. On the other hand, anarchistic theories of art where the
subject takes precedence leaves man direly in want of this unison. Accordingly,
for artwork to be beautiful it must be created in agreement with logos.231
For Ratzinger, the role of beauty in art is to express the mystery of God, but in
doing so it also expresses the mystery of man. 232 This is because man, as reason
and heart, finds his personhood and being in logos. In other words, man is not
defined primarily by his pragma, his works, but rather, by his being, his
personhood, received from another in history and in God. 233 Ratzinger says that,
Christian art is a rational art - let us think of Gothic art or of the great
music or even, precisely, of our own Baroque art - but it is the artistic
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expression of a greatly expanded reason, in which heart and reason
encounter each other.234
Now, if logos is what gives art its beauty, then an ordered Apollonian beauty
divorced from truth cannot be truly beautiful. The kind of beauty that only
appeals to a surface pleasure or base motives actually degrades the ideal of beauty
by divorcing it from truth and love:
A beauty that is deceptive and false, a dazzling beauty that does not bring
human beings out of themselves to open them to the ecstasy of rising to
the heights, but indeed locks them entirely into themselves. Such beauty
does not reawaken a longing for the Ineffable, readiness for sacrifice, the
abandonment of self, but instead stirs up the desire, the will for power,
possession and pleasure. 235
For Ratzinger, the reality of transcendental beauty must be separated from the
breathtaking effect of counterfeit beauty. The latter is represented in
advertisements created with the aim of deceiving man by appealing to his senses.
These false forms of beauty are almost irresistible, making the observer “want to
grab everything and seek the passing satisfaction rather than be open to others”. 236
This critique of aestheticism seems to follow the thoughts of Dostoevsky, who is
often mentioned in Ratzinger’s comments on beauty.237 According to Dostoevsky,
even the devout man finds it difficult to separate himself from the intensity of
sensuous beauty. He calls it the “mysterious as well as terrible” power of the
“beauty of Sodom” which is able to deceive and tempt the “immense mass of
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mankind”. 238 He therefore says that, “God and the devil are fighting there and the
battlefield is the heart of man”. 239 Dostoevsky does not give a simple explanation
for the power of selfish and sensual beauty; it remains a mystery. Yet nor does he
brush the problem aside. He says that it is the “ideal of the Madonna”, the beauty
that is both sorrowful in sin and yet rejoicing in hope, which is the true standard
towards which man strives in the ongoing battle against self-gratification. 240
Ratzinger notes that today’s culture is “not always propitious for accepting a
beauty in full harmony with truth and goodness”, and yet he is greatly hopeful for
the ultimate triumph of transcendental beauty. This is because Ratzinger
recognises that man will always be “desirous of, and nostalgic for, a genuine
beauty that is neither superficial nor ephemeral”. 241 In the next section we shall
consider whether this is a hope worth holding onto in the face of all the ugliness
in the world and in its history.

3.2

Theodor Adorno

3.2.1 Ugliness and Pessimism

Nietzsche clearly rejects the transcendental notion of beauty, and yet he remains
sensitive to the significance of the aesthetic experience. In his critique on modern
music, Nietzsche explains that both popular music and what he calls “advanced
music” transcend the classical favouring of beauty over ugliness. Here, whereas
popular music returns to the sensuality of the primitive and Dionysian cults,
advanced music takes on ugly forms with the aim of achieving symbolic
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meaning. 242 This means that, for Nietzsche, the experience of the ugly confers
more meaning than the beautiful. 243
Like Nietzsche, Adorno proposes a theory of art where ugliness has priority over
beauty. A major difference, however, is that Adorno pays little attention to the
Greek myth of Dionysus. Rather, he stresses that the ugly in art is associated with
the moral realm and manifests man’s socio-political history. In particular, he
points to the moral atrocities of World War II as a burden too heavy for humanity
to express its history adequately through art. The sheer degree and extent of
suffering caused by fellow man in the Holocaust exceeds any attempt to give it
expression, such that one is no longer even capable of writing poetry without
being barbaric.244
Furthermore, Adorno believes it is unjust for one to express joy after the
Holocaust, and for the same reason, art can no longer be made beautiful. Adorno
proscribes any kind of “cheerful art” and the forms of poetry that glorify suffering,
as they constitute an “injustice to the dead; to accumulated, speechless pain”. 245
On the other hand, Adorno does not desire the ultimate demise of art in general.
Far from censuring art, Adorno wishes that art be considered even more important
for its radical connection with human suffering. Art maintains this connection
when it destroys illusions of harmony and becomes a form of social criticism.
However, this is only possible with ugly art. In fact, Adorno claims that man’s
historical condition demands that art be ugly. 246
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Ugly art criticises man’s socio-political history by conveying a truth that is not
rational, that is, it opposes the kind of post-enlightenment rationalistic thinking
which justifies the kind of progress exemplified by the atom-bomb. 247 Adorno
provides a metaphysical grounding for the ugly, suggesting that the ugly, rather
than beauty, is able to express history truthfully because ugliness is the primal
reality of which beauty is a negation. 248 In other words, true aesthetic experience
is of the ugly and not of the beautiful.
In opposition to Plato, Adorno describes the aesthetic experience as “shocks of
incomprehension” that “illuminate the meaningless world”. 249 For Adorno, the
Platonic transcendence experienced in the shock of beauty is but an illusion which
entraps man to self-repression. Adorno’s existential negativity is perhaps best
expressed in the lines:
Even the blossoming tree lies the moment its bloom is seen without the
shadow of terror; even the innocent “How lovely!” becomes an excuse for
an existence outrageously unlovely, and there is no longer beauty or
consolation except in the gaze falling on horror, withstanding it, and in
unalleviated consciousness of negativity holding fast to the possibility of
what is better.250
One can see that Adorno’s overwhelming disappointment in history is reflected in
the deep pessimism of his aesthetics. According to Adorno, the classical tonality
remains enigmatic and because we cannot comprehend it in full, we must accept that it is unable to
reconcile man with nature, nor resolve man’s intellectual desire for philosophical certitude
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of Mozart and Beethoven create the illusion of assurance regarding a transcendent
world. This type of music effectively lies to man by reconfirming the status quo.
This explains Adorno’s admiration for Schoenberg’s twelve-tone-technique,
which “moves emphatically towards the dissolution of art” by the expression of
“lonely subjectivity which withdraws into itself”. 251 According to Adorno,
Schoenberg’s atonal compositions represent the end of music in the sense that it
reaches its telos of self-negation. That is, Schoenberg’s music liberates music
from its very self so that it simply represents the “dissociation of meaning and
expression”.252
The self-negation of Schoenberg’s music also allows man to recognize the
possibility of his own emancipation from repressive self-identity. 253 Here,
Adorno’s pessimism is redoubled considering that even this desired liberation is
only a possibility and no certitude. This exemplifies the potential for ugly art to
signify pessimistic implosion and metaphysical emptiness.

3.2.2 Ugliness According to Ratzinger

In response to Adorno’s negative critique on transcendent beauty, Ratzinger also
asks “Whether beauty is true, or whether it is not ugliness that leads to the deepest
reality”, and “Can the beautiful be genuine, or, in the end, is it only an illusion?
Isn't reality perhaps basically evil?”
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Ratzinger treats Adorno’s critique

seriously because he accepts the existence of a real relationship between morality
and aesthetics. He makes this acknowledgement especially clear when he says,
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The fear that in the end it is not the arrow of the beautiful that leads us to
the truth, but that falsehood, all that is ugly and vulgar, may constitute the
true "reality" has at all times caused people anguish. At present this has
been expressed in the assertion that after Auschwitz it was no longer
possible to write poetry… 255
Ratzinger, like Adorno, accepts that the classical notion of beauty in Apollonian
forms is not enough to deal with the history of human suffering exemplified so
brutally in the Holocaust. Ratzinger says,
This objection, which seemed reasonable enough before Auschwitz when
one realized all the atrocities of history, shows that in any case a purely
harmonious concept of beauty is not enough. It cannot stand up to the
confrontation with the gravity of the questioning about God, truth and
beauty. Apollo, who for Plato's Socrates was "the God" and the guarantor
of unruffled beauty as "the truly divine" is absolutely no longer sufficient.
We have now come to a crucial point in the thesis, where we must now consider,
in some depth, Ratzinger’s theological perspective on the person of Jesus and the
implications of revelation on the meaning of beauty. This will highlight again
Ratzinger’s integration of philosophy and theology in a special relationship with
each other, for it is precisely in their interrelation that he is able to offer a solution
to the aesthetic problem at hand.
A central theme in Ratzinger’s reflection on beauty is founded on Augustine’s
description of a certain paradox that occurs in the scriptures.256 That is, the Psalms
speak of Jesus as, “the fairest of the children of men and grace is poured upon
your lips” (Psalm 44), and yet the book of Isaiah tells us that Jesus “had no beauty,
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no majesty to draw our eyes, no grace to make us delight in him" (Isaiah 53). 257
These two passages describe the same person in the same event, namely, Jesus on
the cross. The event of the cross involves a gruesome and ugly sight of a man
with “no beauty, no majesty to draw our eyes”, but Christianity claims that this
man is also God, the Supreme Beauty. 258 Somehow the beautiful one is seen to
have no beauty at all. The ugliness of death is not ignored, but overcome.
Ratzinger interprets this as a paradox where a new understanding of beauty is to
be “debated anew and suffered”. 259
This paradox of beauty is unheard of in ancient Greek philosophy, and is
described by Augustine as a “beauty in righteousness”, a “beauty which seeks the
eye of the heart”.

260

Since Jesus is “altogether just”, he is “altogether

beautiful”.261 Reflecting on this, Ratzinger says,
…this beauty is not simply a harmony of proportion and form; "the fairest
of the sons of men" is also, mysteriously, the one "who had no form or
comeliness that we should look at him, and no beauty that we should
desire him". Jesus Christ shows us how the truth of love can transform
even the dark mystery of death into the radiant light of the resurrection.
Here the splendour of God's glory surpasses all worldly beauty. The truest
beauty is the love of God, who definitively revealed himself to us in the
paschal mystery. 262
The transcendental metaphysics of the philosophers is limited by its indifference
to suffering and death, but the Beauty of Jesus transforms the ugliness of
suffering and death by his love. Ratzinger reiterates this paradox as an answer to
Adorno’s critique. Indeed, the ugliness of death, with all its shadows,
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paradoxically points to the fact that nothing less than the brightness of love is able
to overcome it.
At the same time, Ratzinger recognizes that Adorno’s criticism of beautiful art
has an element of moral concern for fellow man. As Ratzinger illustrates,
When someone rejoices, he is afraid of offending against solidarity with
the many people who suffer. I don’t have any right to rejoice, people think,
in a world where there is so much misery, so much injustice. 263
However, Ratzinger asserts that this apparently well-intentioned attitude of
denying joy for the sake of solidarity is simply “wrong” because in the end
suffering is not the last word, but rather beauty and truth.264 A beauty which is the
splendour of truth is a beauty that is love, a beauty that can be trusted. The love of
God portrayed on the cross is the beauty that can give us hope and liberate us
from the temptations of nihilism, and from which derives true freedom to love
others.265 Ratzinger explains the situation this way:
… in his Face that is so disfigured, there appears the genuine, extreme
beauty: the beauty of love that goes "to the very end"; for this reason it is
revealed as greater than falsehood and violence. Whoever has perceived
this beauty knows that truth, and not falsehood, is the real aspiration of the
world. It is not the false that is "true", but indeed, the Truth.266
Christ’s love for man expressed in total sacrifice reveals the truth about beauty,
and the beauty of truth. The truth concerning beauty as truth is manifest precisely
in an event of suffering and despair, and we are unable to accept this truth without
an amending our own attitude towards suffering. The only way to see this, the
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only way to hold on to human solidarity with all its misery and yet truly rejoice, is
to “obtain the resources to go on only from God”.267 Ratzinger therefore declares,
Whoever believes in God, in the God who manifested himself, precisely in
the altered appearance of Christ crucified as love "to the end" (John 13:1),
knows that beauty is truth and truth beauty; but in the suffering Christ he
also learns that the beauty of truth also embraces offence, pain, and even
the dark mystery of death, and that this can only be found in accepting
suffering, not in ignoring it.268
This attitude can only come about by a transformation of the heart and not simply
of the logical mind. Ratzinger explains that the reason for this is that a clever and
logical answer to suffering never suffices: “No, the question can only be endured,
suffered through—with him and at the side of him who suffered it to the end for
all of us and with all of us”.269
Ratzinger explains that “The Christian does not gloss over or deny the deep
shadows that fall upon man’s existence in this world”. 270 In fact, according to
Ratzinger, it is only those who accept their sufferings who can have a paradoxical
joy in knowing that beauty is truth and that evil and suffering are not the
fundamental realities of the world. 271 He asserts that this joy,
…reaches the roots of our existence and proves its strength not least in the
fact that it sustains us when all else about us is darkness. Christian joy is
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intended precisely also for those who labour and are heavy-burdened;
those who have no reason to laugh here… 272
Ratzinger further notes that, “In this world of suffering, adoration has continued
to rise up from the fiery furnaces of the crematories and not from the spectators of
the horror”.273 On the other hand, the comfortable onlooker is prone to becoming
guilty and embittered by the suffering of others. The suffering of others becomes
overbearing when contrasted with the comforts of one’s own life so one can
develop a distrust of a God who is both good and beautiful. 274 Ratzinger therefore
appeals to the reason of the heart, that in the midst of difficulties, one may find
hope by the prayerful identification with the suffering figure on the cross. Faith
plays a key part here because it is according to the faith that Jesus, who suffered
thus, also rose from the dead and through his death reconciled the world to God. It
is on account of this belief in the resurrection after death that the faithful can dare
to proclaim that “love is stronger than death”, and so hold with certainty that
beauty overcomes ugliness.275 Ratzinger further expounds:
[It] is the true transformation which the world needs and which alone can
redeem the world. Since Christ, in an act of love has transformed and
defeated violence from within, death itself is transformed: love is stronger
than death. It remains forever.276
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The passionate and sacrificial love of God gives man the necessary hope to affirm
the ultimate truth of beauty and love in the midst of suffering. Indeed, it is in this
regard that Ratzinger accords with Dostoevsky’s famous words of hope, “Beauty
will save the world”. 277 As mentioned, Dostoevsky is for Ratzinger a source of
philosophical and theological thinking, especially in regard to the implications of
beauty experienced in the heart. 278 In Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, Prince Myshkin
says to Rogozhin, “The essence of religious feeling does not depend on reason,
and it has nothing to do with wrongdoing or crime or with atheism. There is
something else there and there always will be, and atheists will always pass over
it and will never be talking about that”.279 In the paradox of beauty – the death of
Jesus depicts the beauty of love as truth, but this paradox is insurmountable by
positivistic limitations on reason or the denial of love by a false preference for the
violent and ugly. Ratzinger, along with Pope Francis, surmises:
… it is precisely in contemplating Jesus’ death that faith grows stronger
and receives a dazzling light; then it is revealed as faith in Christ’s
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steadfast love for us, a love capable of embracing death to bring us
salvation. 280
This understanding of beauty can only be supported by faith and personal
suffering. These are related because suffering purifies the heart and allows one to
understand better the love shown in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Ratzinger
expresses that this realisation is the fundamental kernel of joy in life, and stands
in contradistinction to Nietzsche’s distaste for Christian sacrifice. He says,
The Cross, which was for Nietzsche the most detestable expression of the
negative character of the Christian religion, is in truth the centre of the
evangelium, the glad tidings: “It is good that you exist” – no, “It is
necessary that you exist.” The Cross is the approbation of our existence,
not in words, but in an act so completely radical that it caused God to
become flesh and pierced this flesh to the quick; that, to God, it was worth
the death of his incarnate Son. One who is so loved that the other
identifies his life with this love and no longer desires to live if he is
deprived of it; one who is loved even unto death— such a one knows that
he is truly loved. But if God so loves us, then we are loved in truth. Then
love is truth, and truth is love. Then life is worth living. 281
Whereas Nietszche points to eros as the primary form of love, Christian joy is
founded on a love that is both eros and agape. Ratzinger formulates this precise
relationship of hope with beauty, recalling Pope Paul VI’s words to artists at the
close of the Second Vatican Council,
This world in which we live needs beauty in order not to sink into despair.
Beauty, like truth, brings joy to the human heart, and is that precious fruit
which resists the erosion of time, which unites generations and enables
them to be one in admiration. 282
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Meanwhile, the cult of the ugly opposes joy as if it was only fit for the foolish and
the gullible. Adorno suggests that the idea of eternal joy is a crude joke when we
face the overwhelming evils of suffering in human history. 283 Ratzinger’s
presentation of beauty as relating to the salvation of the world is not simply
intended to subdue cynicism and pessimism, but stands for something positive,
something absolutely real and tangible. Beauty reveals that joy is possible, not by
ignoring death but by overcoming it by love, and this is why we can have hope in
suffering.

3.2.3 A New Understanding of Being

By these reflections, Ratzinger suggests that the Ancient Greek understanding of
beauty is inadequate precisely on account of their limited theological scope. The
unchangeable, transcendent and perfect form of beauty is for the Greeks based on
the unchangeable, transcendent and perfect God of being in combination with the
refined mythical form of Apollo. According to Ratzinger, the Ancient Greek
understanding of God as being is helpful and necessary to understand the
Christian God, who is indeed Being, Truth, Goodness and Beauty. As discussed
earlier, the knowledge of being bestowed by the encounter with beauty is already
purported by Plato to be synonymous with a kind of love. 284 However, these
metaphysical principles fall short of depicting the God who is also person.
Christian theology, by engaging with Ancient Greek metaphysics, reveals that the
transcendent being that irrupts in the splendour of the form, is not an impersonal
reality, but an encounter with the person of Jesus himself “who has smitten them
with this longing. It is he who has sent a ray of his beauty into their eyes”. 285 In
this way, Ratzinger ties the philosophical account of transcendental convertibility
with the perception and knowledge of a paradoxical beauty of love in the person
of Jesus.
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Christianity gives a new perspective on beauty. This is the beauty of Jesus, the
beauty of love which radiates truth and goodness. According to Ratzinger, this is
possible because God is both love and logos: “The God of faith, as thought, is
also love”. 286 He continues, “the creative original thought, is at the same time
love”, such that “truth and love are originally identical; that where they are
completely realized they are not two parallel or even opposing realities but one,
the one and only absolute”. 287 In other words, God is love precisely as he is
reason. As such, the Christian understanding of reason culminates in the divine
person of Jesus: “The world comes from reason and this reason is a Person, is
Love”.288 Being, truth and logos, each of these then is also convertible with love.
If the same love represents the desire and love for the truth, then this must have
implications for the way we understanding the acquirement of knowledge. This
confirms Augustine’s notion that when one loves something he “seeks for its
face”. 289 Ratzinger develops on this by explaining that “to love means wishing to
know”, and that this drive is integral to accepting the truth.290 In order to attain
true knowledge, we must first love the truth and seek it with all our heart, which
implies the need for sacrifice, as Ratzinger explains:
Only by understanding do I receive reality at all; and understanding, in
turn, depends on a certain measure of inner identification with what is to
be understood. It depends on love. I cannot really understand something
for which I have no love whatsoever. So the transmission of the message
needs more than the kind of memory that stores telephone numbers: what
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is requires is a memory of the heart, in which I invest something of
myself. 291
For Ratzinger, the greatest knowledge concerns the question, “how can God enter
into the human spirit?”, and it is in approaching this knowledge, whether “from
the concept of God or from the nature of man,” which “leads us to the most
profound depth of our understanding of reality per se”.292 It is only by loving,
then, that we can have insight into the nature of beauty as love and truth in the
person of Jesus. He is both the beauty of eros which is manifest in his yearning
love to redeem mankind, and also the beauty of agape, as the person who loves to
the very end. Jesus loves by embracing suffering and so reveals what is truly
beautiful and human. One accepts the same beauty conferred in the loving act of
Jesus by emulating his love, both in eros and agape. That is, by a life of love and
sacrifice. Beauty, then, calls out to all to respond to this love by exercising their
freedom for the good, and in this way, it offers to make man beautiful and whole.
For Ratzinger, the saint becomes the epitome of ugliness to the world in his selfrenunciation, but by precisely the same act of love he becomes eminently
beautiful as he reflects the true beauty of God. 293

3.2.4 Being-from and Being-for

Beauty is convertible with being and yet beauty is also person. This is founded on
Ratzinger’s understanding of being as relation. Ratzinger explains that the
Christian God remains “the highest possibility of Being”, and this “highest mode
of Being includes the element of relationship”. 294 Ratzinger continues, “Being no
longer appears as absolute, enclosed autarchy but turns out to be at the same time
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involvement, creative power, which creates and bears and loves other things…” 295
This points to the distinction between what is conceived as Being of the ancient
philosophers and God as Being in Christian thought. Ratzinger asks,
Is the God who names himself and has a name, the God who helps and is
always there, radically different from the esse subsistens, the absolute
Being, that is discovered in the lonely silence of philosophical speculation,
or what?296
This is elucidated in Ratzinger’s analysis of the nature of persons. He writes,
“Person” in God is the pure relativity of being turned toward each other; it
is situated, not on the level of substance – the substance is one- but rather
on the level of dialogue, of being related to one another… the Christian
faith gave birth to this idea of pure actuality, of pure relativity, which does
not lie on the level of substance and does not affect or divide the substance
per se, and thus brought the personal phenomenon plainly into view. 297
Ratzinger further explains that the three Persons of the Trinity “are not substances
alongside one another; rather, they are nothing other than actual, real relations”,
such that “In God, person means relation. … the Person exists by his very nature
only as relation”.298 Regarding this, Ratzinger refers to Richard of St Victor who
points out that “person” is not in the realm of essence but rather “on the level of
existence”. 299
Ratzinger suggests that being as person is also “Being from and for someone”. 300
When this is applied to man, it explains “the unique structure of the soul, which
can exist only in the manner of dialogue and freedom”. It gives a clue to how the
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beauty of participation in being, convertible with truth and goodness, may also
simultaneously be a beauty that is personal love. 301
Ratzinger points out, however, that it is common to hear the false notion that man
is a product of his own freedom, which stems from Sartre’s concept of freedom as
one of absolute self-determination. 302 It is a freedom loosed from any sense of
boundary which is associated with the idea that praxis has potential to become
progress.303 Expressions of art with a radically inflated emphasis on subjectivism
such as deconstructive or anarchistic art theories are often founded on this empty
notion of freedom where, in fact, the subject himself is lost.304
The falsity of this claim can be established simply by considering the fact that
man is not “free” to live longer than his nature allows. Man is mortal and this
reality cannot be changed by self-determination. This problem will remain as long
as freedom is equated with complete autonomy, which usually chooses to ignore
this fact altogether since the depressing reality of death steers one from
confronting it in thought thereby allowing one to fall into the comfort of
perceived self-sufficiency, into his own “little immortality”. 305 Death reveals that
a person’s existence is contingent on another, and this dependency reveals that
relationship is the principle by which human beings exist as persons.
In presenting this idea of person, Ratzinger refers to the concept of the I-Thou,
introduced by Ferdinand Ebner and developed on by Martin Buber. Buber’s
notion of the I-Thou stipulates that a person is only insofar as he is an I in
communication with a Thou. More precisely, man discovers that his own being is
made for relation when he experiences the God as other and subsequently
recognizes that the capacity to know this other can only derive from self301
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realisation. Accordingly, the first and fundamental relationship for man is with
God, the eternal-Thou.306 In line with this, Ratzinger suggests that it is when one
realises himself in dialogue with God that he begins to know himself more
completely, for “man himself is the place in which and through which he
experiences God”.307
Moreover, Ratzinger reveals that being-as-relation has further consequences when
it expresses the communal reality of God as Trinity and man as collective species.
That is, between God and man, there is an element of plurality on both sides as
God is not simply a person, but precisely persons (of the Trinity), and man is not
only an individual but man in the community of the human race. 308 Therefore,
man’s relationship with God is not exhausted by the I-Thou relationship alone, but
must also encompass an element of We-We.309 Finally, as man is to be understood
as being in relation to the plurality of persons in the Trinity, not only from the
perspective of the individual, but also in light of man as part of the human race,
we can recognize our nature as being-from and being-for implies a relationship of
communal love.
For Ratzinger, man is finite whether considered as individual or as species,
however, the relationship that exists between the We of man and the We of God
guarantees man’s dignity. Ratzinger says,
Of all creatures God loves man in a special way and confers upon him an
extraordinary dignity, giving him that glory which the rebellious angels
lost. The human race may thus be counted as the tenth choir of the angelic
306
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hierarchy. Indeed human beings are able to know God in himself, that is,
his one nature in the Trinity of Persons. 310
The relationship between the persons of the Trinity is that of love, and so it is this
love that analogously defines the nature of the intrinsic relationship between man
and fellow man. In other words, the truth of our being is first and foremost
realised in our existence as persons who are loved and are made for loving. It is
only in accordance with our nature as being-in-relation that we can respond to
God’s love with our own love for him and for others.
Ratzinger points out that of all the philosophers it is the atheist Ludwig Feuerbach
who recognizes this we of man. 311 Individual man attains to his grandeur only
insofar as he is communal man. However, Feuerbach goes further than identifying
the finitude of individuality because he proposes the absoluteness of man as
species, and in this claim to absoluteness through community Feuerbach
deliberately excludes humanity’s relationship with God.312
The significance of this for the understanding of beauty is that, for Feuerbach,
beauty only amounts to a sign of man’s love for himself as a species, whereas for
Ratzinger, the role and effect of beauty is proportional to its capacity to facilitate
for man the experience of the dialogical relationship with the Thou in the
Trinitarian God. Furthermore, beauty also signifies plurality in unity since God
exists as community of the Trinity, and man correspondingly finds himself in
community as species.
Ultimately, for Ratzinger, both beauty and being converge in the relationship that
is God as persons. Beauty is truth and love, and these are not concepts in a
310
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vacuum, but rather “have a face and a name. They issue a call to us. For they are
‘Love’, that is to say, a person”. 313 The potency of beauty is realized in the
encounter with this person, the eternal-Thou, who is intuited as someone distinct
from the I, but which then reveals the I in greater depth, that is, of man as being in
communion with each other and with God. This is what moves one to the
conviction of truth, a “Conversio (‘conversion’, metanoia)” to a more certain
knowledge of reality.
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Conclusion

Ratzinger observes that today beauty is often used and manipulated for power and
gain. 315 Although the corruption of beauty and the atrocities of human history
might seem to support the cynical view that considers beauty a wasteful deception
and even recommends ugliness as the ultimate foundation of reality, Ratzinger’s
aesthetics is able to respond to these challenges. By combining both philosophical
and theological insights as well as reflecting on his own experience of beauty,
Ratzinger presents a renewed understanding of beauty that culminates in its
identification with truth and love. Beauty is not simply a judgment of taste that
changes according to whether the observer feels pleasure in it. It is a metaphysical
reality that has precedence over man. Ratzinger wishes to express this truth about
beauty, and even more, to build a religious and cultural environment where
beauty is cherished as a way to communicate with God, the supreme Beauty.
An important point in his presentation of beauty is that beauty concerns not only
eros, which is enkindled by the reasoned forms, but also agape. Plato explains
that beauty is not simply external for he also believes that the beautiful forms of
visible things participate in invisible beauty. In other words, it is through the
external things, not as an end but as a means, that we fly unto the unchanging
eternal Beauty. However, it is clear that when burdened by the ugliness of human
weakness and the certainty of death, an understanding of beauty limited to its
Apollonian appearance is unable to seed a hope proper to existence as contained
in the Christian message. The external form of the cross reveals then an internal
beauty.
Ratzinger explains, however, that this internal beauty is the same beauty manifest
in the logos, which reveals itself in the mangled body of the crucifix. Beauty, in
its primary sense then, is a person, Jesus Christ, who loves by both eros and
agape. This beauty of love is the foundation of reality, which means that beauty
reigns supreme and overshadows all the moral ugliness of history.
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The passion of Christ makes this possible – and this is a point that is certainly
given greater clarity in light of philosophical aesthetics. This points again to a
theme so significant in Ratzinger’s works: the relationship between philosophy
and theology. Indeed, Ratzinger makes these points about the beauty of Christ
because he stays open to the pertinent philosophical arguments concerning beauty
in philosophy in addition to his own reflections on real personal experiences of
beauty.
Furthermore, according to Ratzinger, the beauty of Christ makes beautiful all who
model their life on the same beauty of love. 316 It is important to embrace the role
of eros in such a life, which goes against Nietzsche’s understanding of the
Christian life as essentially representing aestheticism whereby eros is completely
destroyed. 317 Ratzinger explains that the eros of Christianity is one that is purified
and proves its value by stimulating the elevation of man in his quest for union
with the divine. 318 Eros, which is built up and nurtured in a culture of beauty in
full accordance with love and truth, is also ordered towards the unification of the
internal structure of man’s being, such that his spirit and body, intellect, will and
sentiment are united in the “all-embracing act of love”. 319 To unite one’s own
being with love means to unite the intellect and will with that of God. One can
then “see from the perspective of Jesus”, and so perceive “beyond external
appearances”. 320 At this point, eros transforms into agape, so that one can say “I
love even the person whom I do not like or even know”. 321 Indeed, agape is not
the kind of love that looks inwardly at one’s own life, but a love that is willing to
give up one’s life for another.
Ratzinger explains that the theological tradition of the Trinity as persons reveals
that being is relational at its core and that this relationship is one of love. In order
to reflect the beauty that is the divine being, one must reflect the relationship of
316
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love that is God, and this involves the knowledge that love involves suffering.322
This is because the metaphysical dimension of beauty as being-in-relation
coincides with the understanding of beauty as agape expressed in the God who
suffers and dies.
Ultimately, in presenting the paradoxical notion of the suffering beauty which is
at once both truth and goodness, Ratzinger does not aim to give a simple formula
that makes sense of beauty once and for all. In fact, by means of the paradox
Ratzinger tells us that the reality of beauty is beyond our capacity to define it
precisely because beauty is a person. However, this also means that we can know
beauty personally in our hearts, which is not at all irrational, since this beauty is
the person of logos. As such, beauty teaches us that reason does not preclude
feeling and experience.
Whereas Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche focus on the immanent quality of the
experience of the beautiful, Ratzinger ascribes to the Platonic-Augustinian
tradition where the experience of beauty is understood to take us into a
transcendental realm. At the same time, we remain in this world and come to
know it better.
A true knowledge of being cannot be expressed or acquired through logical
concepts alone, but it can be known precisely by the effect of beauty on the
heart.323 This points to a heart that is able to grasp reality with an expanded reason,
one which does not lock beauty away in the limitations of philosophical discourse,
but one which remains open to the broad experience of reality.
This openness of the heart means that it is not primarily the case that we “judge”
beauty in an active sense, but rather we “experience” it in a passive sense. That is,
beauty itself is to be considered active and the observer passive. Beauty shocks us
and we are left emotionally and spiritually disturbed by the burning desire that it
instils in our hearts.324 Now, when the heart is so moved by beauty it desires to
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unite itself to it, and by remaining open to the reality of beauty, the heart begins to
see the truth in an intuitive way. Ratzinger proposes that in following this path of
beauty, one can become convinced of the reality of God as truth and love in his
overwhelming goodness. This truth is revealed each time beauty is encountered
with a well-disposed heart.
In his aesthetics, Ratzinger rejects the theories that construe beauty as being
merely an irrational sentiment, or a product of the subjective mind, or an element
of the will to power, or a façade of a primal ugliness. It is by reflecting on the
impact of beauty on his heart, as well as seriously considering the joint
contribution of philosophy and theology that allows Ratzinger to reject these
contrary theories and maintain his metaphysical view of beauty, which is truth
and goodness and at the same time the suffering love of God.
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